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THE NEW POLICING
Philip B. Heymann*
The purpose of this article is to examine a remarkable develop-
ment in law enforcement: the exploration of new forms of policing
by combinations of police leaders and academics. This examina-
tion focuses on three major cities-New York, Chicago, and Bos-
ton-that have developed three different combinations of
problem-solving and new forms of relationships with neighbor-
hoods that are often called "community policing." As a result of
these immense undertakings, we have seen a change in belief in the
efficacy of policing. But the changed attitudes towards police func-
tions are accompanied by certain risks.
I. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE NEW POLICING
I will begin by describing the weaknesses and the strengths of the
argument that new forms of policing have had a major effect on
fear and safety in our cities and, through that, on the quality of life
for millions of people. But wholly aside from the amount of evi-
dence for this belief, it exists and that in turn has changed the atti-
tudes toward policing of citizens and political leaders alike.
It is important to look at New York, Chicago, and Boston sepa-
rately, for they represent somewhat different approaches based on
different theories supported by different police leaders and schol-
ars. Their apparent successes explain the change in attitude toward
police, but the approaches differ along the two dimensions that
many consider most important: reduction of crime and disorder
and an increase in trust in the police.
I will describe generally the practices and theories of policing in
each of these three cities and provide some evidence as to what
each is doing better or worse. But then it is worth departing from
the broad models, each of which may hide too much that is impor-
tant and particular under a single theory that seems almost as copi-
ous as an ideology. We should look much harder at the underlying
operations of each cities' police department. And, finally, we
should consider the values affected by, and the risks associated
with, the different forms of policing.
* Philip B. Heymann is the James Barr Ames Professor of Law at Harvard Law
School.
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A. The National Decline in Crime
Before turning to the changes in theory and practice of policing
and their consequences, we should note the importance of the new
belief that policing can make a big difference in the amount of vio-
lent crime, property crime, and troublesome disorder. In focusing
on the new belief, I am not trying to raise doubts about the reduc-
tion in fear and the increase in safety that have occurred through-
out the United States. There may be some questions as to the role
of policing in bringing this about-though these questions do not
trouble most of our politicians and citizens-but there is little
doubt about the fact of these changes, particularly the actual and
significant reduction in fear and increase in safety in most places
throughout the United States and particularly in two of the cities
which we will be examining.
Figures on reported crime and surveys of citizens tell identical
stories. After a rapid increase during the 1960s, there was long-
term stability in crime rates in the United States during the follow-
ing quarter century.' That stability included a homicide rate in the
United States that was three or four times as high as those of other
Western democracies.2 It was also widely believed that non-lethal
violent crime greatly exceeded that of comparably advanced
countries.3
Within this long-term trend, something dramatic first happened
in the mid-1980s when the amount of youth violence, particularly
killing, shot up dramatically, while violence by those over twenty-
five was declining. Then, in the early 1990s, the direction of change
reversed and for the rest of the twentieth century, crime, including
violent crime, declined radically to levels we had not seen since the
1960s.4 Arrests of males under age eighteen for violent crimes de-
clined 26% between 1994 and 1999.5 The trend has continued into
1. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, HOMICIDE TRENDS
IN THE UNITED STATES § 2 (2000), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/homicide/hmrt.htm
[hereinafter HOMICIDE TRENDS].
2. OFFICE FOR DRUG CONTROL & CRIME PREVENTION, UNITED NATIONS,
GLOBAL REPORT ON CRIME AND JUSTICE 312-14 (Grame Newman ed., 1999) (listing
homicide rates for more than three dozen industrial countries as reported in five
United Nations surveys between 1974 and 1993).
3. Id.
4. HOMICIDE TRENDS, supra note 1, at § 3.
5. Keith Bradsher, Fear of Crime Trumps the Fear of Lost Youth, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 21, 1999, at D3.
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the current year, although some major cities, including Boston, ex-
perienced an ominous spike in the first few months of 2000.6
Between 1993 and 1998, property crimes declined in the United
States by 32% and violent crimes declined by 27%. The decline
has been spectacular with regard to such non-violent crimes as mo-
tor vehicle theft or ordinary thefts of less than fifty dollars. Moreo-
ver, this decline has been about equally sharp for males and
females, black and white, urban, suburban, and rural. 7
One area of great public concern did not appear to follow this
general course. Although the use of illicit drugs had peaked in the
late 1970s, and the decline that followed in the mid-1980s was re-
versed by an epidemic of smokable crack cocaine, there was a great
decline in overall use in the 1980s and, except for marijuana use,
prevalence of use in the population continued at a relatively low
level into the 1990s. 8 However, there is little, if any, indication that
the price of illicit drugs has risen or that their purity has declined,
nor is there any reason to think that their availability has lessened. 9
The crack cocaine epidemic has greatly abated; but that seems to
have far more to do with the natural course of a drug epidemic,
including the growing desire of young people to avoid the conse-
quences they see in their addicted elders, than with any success in
6. E.g., Tom Farmer, Violent Crimes Plunge in U.S., BOSTON HERALD, Aug. 28,
2000, at 1 (noting that Boston had already surpassed its 1999 murder total, and that
police had reported a 13% increase in shootings); Brett Martel, Murder on Rise in
Major Cities, CHI. SUN-TIMES, June 23, 2000, at 26 (reporting that murders had in-
creased over 1999 murder rates in Baltimore, Boston, Dallas, Los Angeles, New Orle-
ans, New York, and Philadelphia); Don Terry, In a Turn of the Tide, Bloodshed Rises
in Los Angeles, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2000, at A14 (reporting a 7.5% increase in vio-
lent crime over 1999 in Los Angeles, including more murders, rapes, and robberies,
but noting that "with only a few exceptions, violent crime is down nationwide"). But
see, e.g., Eric Lipton, Giuliani Pulls His Charts Out for a Review of New York, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 15, 2000, at B9 ("In the first six months of this year, crimes in the seven
major categories fell 7.8%" in New York City).
7. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL CRIME
VICTIMIZATION SURVEY, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION 1998, CHANGES 1997-98 WITH
TRENDS 1993-98, at 9 tbl.7, 11 tbl.8, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cv98.pdf (re-
porting sharp declines in property crimes and declines in violent crimes for specific
demographic groups between 1993 and 1998) [hereinafter VICTIMIZATION SURVEY].
8. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 1997, at 245 tbl.3.83 (1998).
9. OFFICE OF NAT'L DRUG CONTROL POLICY, DRUG DATA SUMMARY 4 (1999)
(explaining the increase in purity and decrease in price for four types of drugs be-
tween 1981 and 1998), available at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/pdf./
95253.pdf.
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policing, despite mammoth increases since 1980 in expenditure and
in rates and duration of imprisonment.10
Returning to the sudden reduction in violence, particularly in le-
thal violence, since the early 1990s, a number of consequences
should be noted. Evidence ranging from the self-reports of
mothers and children in Boston to the immense increase in opti-
mism and tourism in New York documents the change in the qual-
ity of life that has been brought about by reduced violence, and
perhaps also by reduced property crime and disorder. Leaders in
cities as far away as Johannesburg, Moscow, and Buenos Aires
want to learn whatever there is to learn about the relationship of
new forms of policing to a wonderfully improved quality of life in
many American neighborhoods and cities.
If policing really is making the difference, we should acknowl-
edge that fact in terms of a variety of decisions about the expendi-
ture of resources. Resources should be moving toward police from
the immense human and dollar costs of the present rush towards
ever longer sentences that have made us one of the world's two
leaders in percentage of population behind bars.' At the same
time, the general public may be willing to bear new personal costs
associated with intrusive policing measures, if the benefits are as
great as they seem. In Chicago, for example, tenants of housing
projects have voted to authorize apartment searches without the
prerequisites of the Fourth Amendment, a move rejected by a fed-
eral court.12
B. Are the Increase in Safety and the Reduction in Fear
Results of the New Forms of Policing in the United States?
The accelerating reduction in violent and other crime beginning
in the early 1990s plainly coincided with a series of major changes
in policing. The three cities we are examining, New York, Chicago,
10. E.g., Richard Curtis, Symposium, The Improbable Transformation of Inner-
City Neighborhoods: Crime, Violence, Drugs, and Youth in the 1990s, 88 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1233, 1260 (1998) (stating that many African American youth through-
out New York City have avoided heroin and crack in the 1990s because of such factors
as the AIDS epidemic and the increased death toll from drug dealer turf wars).
11. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REPORT 1999, at
387 (1998); see also BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 1996, at 528 tbl.6.30 (1997) (noting
that the number of prisoners in custody of federal and state authorities was 1,037,686
in 1995).
12. Pratt v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 848 F. Supp. 792 (N.D. Ill. 1994); Tracey L.
Meares & Dan M. Kahan, When Rights Are Wrong, BOSTON REV., Apr./May 1999, at
4 (providing an overview of the incident).
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and Boston, all began new programs shortly before 1995. As we
shall see, there are common-sense and theoretical reasons to be-
lieve that the forms of policing have made a difference; but before
awarding the credit to policing, we should recognize the claims of
other contenders in explaining reduced crime.
1. Some Other Explanations for Declining Rates of Crime
There are reasons to look for alternative explanations. Violent
and other crime is decreasing in many cities throughout the United
States, including in cities where policing strategies are very differ-
ent from those of New York, Chicago, or Boston. New York and
Boston have enjoyed remarkable rates of decline, but so have sev-
eral other cities, which are implementing quite different ap-
proaches a3 Moreover, other factors unrelated to policing, but
highly correlated with the conditions we associate with crime, are
changing at the same time. Teenage pregnancy has gone down
steadily during the last six or seven years." The decline in birth
rates between 1991 and 1996 among black teens between the ages
of fifteen and nineteen is particularly striking.1 5 There seems to be
no obvious relationship between policing and teenage pregnancies,
although there has always been a close relationship among crime,
violence, teen pregnancy, drug use, and other forms of social
breakdown.1 6 That suggests that an additional factor-other than
policing-may be at work.
Several candidates seem obvious. First, the drop in crime could
be tied to the sustained economic boom. Not only has poverty
been declining since 1993 for juveniles under the age of eighteen,
but the proportion of black juveniles (whose involvement in dan-
gerous violence as victim or perpetrator has been much the high-
est) living in poverty has also been declining sharply during that
13. Compare BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL
VICTIMIZATION AND PERCEPTIONS OF COMMUNITY SAFETY IN 12 CITIES, 1998, at 9(1999) (reporting that New York's murder rate fell 65.8% between 1990 and 1997)
[hereinafter COMMUNITY SAFETY], with id. (reporting that San Diego's murder rate
fell 53.3% during the same period), and id. (reporting that Los Angeles's murder rate
fell 42.2% during the same period).
14. Marc Lacey, Teen-Age Birth Rate in U.S. Falls Again, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27,
1999, at A16.
15. Judith Havemann, Birthrate Drops for Teens of All Races, WASH. POST, May 1,
1998, at Al (reporting a 20.6% drop for black teens during that period).
16. E.g., JAN M. CHAIKEN & MARCIA R. CHAIKEN, VARIETIES OF CRIMINAL BE-
HAVIOR: SUMMARY AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 25 (1982) (noting that "[d]rug use is
one of the major factors associated with virtually every type of crime [ ] studied, and
specific forms of drug use correlate strongly with crime types and rates").
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period. 17 Unemployment is at near-record lows; and by 1996, 86%
of black young adults were completing high school. 18
There are a number of other available explanations, besides new
forms of policing, which supporters would claim have led to the
reduction of crime and the fear of crime. During the last few years,
we have seen the end of the crack epidemic in most cities,19 an
epidemic which spawned drug-selling gangs and the varieties of vi-
olent crime that we associate with the Prohibition era of the 1920s.
Drug markets have stabilized. Dealers in stabilized industries do
not kill each other; thus, dealers in illicit drugs may be particularly
violent only at the early stages of a rapidly expanding market.2 °
Just as the use of crack declined when successive generations
witnessed the degrading experiences of older brothers and sisters,
the same learning-but this time about guns-may have happened
as a result of the violence of the late 1980s. 2 1 A very high percent-
age of young people in disadvantaged neighborhoods had friends
who had been killed.22
Efforts of people other than the police to deal with youth vio-
lence also played a role. Prevention efforts by committed members
of the community, including organizations such as churches and
schools, increased immensely in response to the burst of youth vio-
lence, and helped make a difference.23
Another quite provocative explanation, recently advanced in a
leading economics journal, is the rise of legalized abortion some
17. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU
HISTORICAL POVERTY TABLES-PEOPLE tbl.3, available at http://www.census.gov/
hhes/poverty/histpov/hstpov3.htm (current through Nov. 30, 2000).
18. NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS 17
tbl.8 (1998).
19. E.g., Alexandra Marks, Teens Drive Decline of "Crack" Craze, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Jan. 6, 1999, at 1; Lance Williams, Crime Drop Mirrors Falling Popularity
of Crack Cocaine, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 29, 1998, at A14.
20. Fox Butterfield, Drop in Homicide Rate Linked to Crack's Decline, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 27, 1997, at A12 (reporting on a Justice Department study finding that the
"waning of the crack cocaine epidemic" was the "most important reason" for the drop
in homicide rates through the 1990s).
21. E.g., Fox Butterfield, Scared Straight; The Wisdom of Children Who Have
Known Too Much, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 1997, at D1 (discussing how inner-city youth
are "recoil[ing] from the gun culture" because many have witnessed shootings or seen
relatives or friends incarcerated).
22. E.g., id.
23. See generally John Buntin, A Community Responds: Boston Confronts an Up-
surge of Youth Violence (1999) (unpublished manuscript written for John F. Kennedy
School of Government Case Program).
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twenty years prior to the beginning of the decline in crime rates. 24
Indeed, the article attributes roughly half of the decrease in crime
to the government's newfound protection of the right to choose.
Finally, there are those who would argue passionately, and per-
suasively, that the reduction in violent crime was traceable far less
to policing and any increase in the numbers of arrests than to legis-
lation and the longer prison sentences it imposed, along with the
consequent prolonged incapacitation of violent offenders. A rela-
tively small proportion of the people born in any given year is
likely to commit a high percentage of the crimes and a very high
percentage of the violent crimes. When we lock up a higher and
higher proportion of the population for longer periods of time, a
very high proportion of this particularly dangerous group is impris-
oned because they offend and risk arrest so often. This reduces the
level of violence on our streets, albeit at great cost. And, some-
what less plausibly, believers in increased deterrence resulting from'
the perceived threat of a very long sentence for those who are suc-
cessfully caught and prosecuted have argued that the reductions in
crime are directly traceable to that deterrent.
2. The Case for New Forms of Policing as a Major Cause of
Reduced Crime
With so many other explanations, why is there reason to believe
that new forms of policing are playing a significant role in the re-
duction of violence and fear? For one thing, some of the sharpest
reductions in crime have taken place in Boston and New York
where the new forms of policing have been the most thoroughly
explored and most enthusiastically implemented. For another,
some of the connections between the new forms of policing and the
reduction in violence are so plausible that it is hard to imagine that
they have not had a major effect. Finally, some fairly rigorous
evaluations of recent policing tactics support the hypothesis of
effectiveness.
We know, for example, that the increase in youth homicide was
almost entirely attributable to homicides with guns; there has been
24. John J. Donohue III & Steven D. Levitt, Legalized Abortion and Crime, 115
Q.J. ECON. (forthcoming 2000), at http://www.mitpress.mit.edu/journals/QJEC/
forthcoming.html.
25. See, e.g., Daniel Kessler & Steven D. Levitt, Using Sentence Enhancements to
Distinguish Between Deterrence and Incapacitation, 42 J.L. & ECON. 343, 346 (1999)
(employing a novel approach to separating incapacitation effects from deterrence ef-
fects, and finding that the latter had a "nontrivial" effect on a series of 1982 sentence
enhancements in California).
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no significant increase in homicide with other weapons.26 And
both trends have worked in reverse. As Professor Alfred Blum-
stein of Carnegie Mellon University and Professor Richard Rosen-
feld of the University of Missouri-St. Louis have pointed out, the
reduction in national homicides in the mid-1990s was very close to
the reduction in the number of gun homicides, suggesting again
that control of guns has been an important tactic. 7 We also know
that many homicides occur because of quarrels and other events
taking place on the streets. Policing strategies like those of New
York that greatly increase the risk of arrest for carrying a gun on
the street, particularly for gangs or other groups that have more
frequently engaged in violence, should therefore lead to reduced
homicides with guns. In fact, those are the homicides that have
been declining rapidly.
Similarly, we have believed for centuries that certainty and swift-
ness of punishment are critical to the effectiveness of deterrence.
In Boston, the police are using their powers in new ways to ensure
that the deterrent threat to particularly dangerous individuals is
very certain and prompt, targeted specifically to a particular type
of conduct such as violence, and directly communicated to those
most likely to use violence. To determine who is most likely to use
violence, Boston police have analyzed data from reports or investi-
gations and have used computers to compile information available
by observation of associations on the street. Strategies, like those
adopted in Boston, to assure that speed and certainty of punish-
ment are known to those likely to engage in violence seem almost
certain to reduce violence.
In both New York and Boston, creating social control and, relat-
edly, reducing fear, have been -accomplished by using the powers of
the police to take back the street from gangs. The Department of
Justice's Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention es-
timates that, in 1996, almost 3000 homicides in large cities and sub-
urban counties were attributed to gang members.2 8 Reducing the
apparent street power of gangs competing for status, turf, or drug
profits seems likely to reduce gang homicides.
26. Alfred Blumstein & Richard Rosenfeld, Explaining Recent Trends in U.S.
Homicide Rates, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1175, 1196 (1998); see also id. at 1194
fig.6b, 1195 fig.6c.
27. Id. at 1196.
28. OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, 1996 NATIONAL
YOUTH GANG SURVEY 32 (1999).
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3. A Closer Look at What We Know About Police Tactics and
Reduced Crime
There is another way to look at developments in policing-one
that does not rely so exclusively on the theories of a few academics
and police commissioners. The broad models of policing in cities
like Chicago, New York, and Boston, can be usefully disaggregated
by first identifying the critical powers of the police and then analyz-
ing the innovative ways these powers are being used. It is useful to
begin with a reminder of the powers, legitimate and borderline le-
gitimate, granted to the police in the United States. It is through
the use of those powers in a particular set of tactics that street
crime may be reduced, either by creating deterrence, gathering in-
telligence, or establishing a feeling of police or neighborhood con-
trol of the streets. What we know about the use of these powers to
reduce crime should be reviewed, before turning to the broader
and more complex strategies that have characterized policing in
Chicago, New York, and Boston. The present powers of the police
are relatively well known:
1. To arrest, search, or engage in electronic surveillance if
there is probable cause to conclude that the person has com-
mitted a crime.29
2. To seek or give a suspect concessions in exchange for infor-
mation or evidence useful against others.3 °
3. To "stop" if there is reasonable suspicion to believe that the
person is about to commit a crime or has just committed a
crime, and to frisk if there is reason to fear the person may
be armed.3'
4. To "stop" cars on the ground that they are being operated in
any way, however minor, in violation of local ordinances or
state laws.32
5. To seek consent to search the stopped car or, alternatively,
to search without consent by either arresting the driver for a
traffic violation or developing a reasonable suspicion that
the driver might be armed.33
6. To take advantage of even obvious confusion by a suspect
about whether he has a right to say "no" to a search of his
29. Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 256 (1979).
30. United States v. Baldwin, 60 F.3d 363, 365 (7th Cir. 1995).
31. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24 (1968).
32. Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 412 (1997).
33. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147 (1972).
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home, car, or person, or to refuse to answer questions when
not formally under compulsion to remain.34
7. To imply, deceitfully, that they intend to exercise powers of
arrest or restraint that they in fact do not have, in order to
gain leverage to force a recalcitrant witness or suspect to
cooperate.
8. To suggest a possible use of force even though its use would
be illegal.
3 6
9. To engage in any of these activities in a way that is designed
to interfere with the subject's personal or business
relations.3 7
10. To analyze material obtained in reports or investigations of
individual crimes and to gather useful intelligence from
these reports.38
Police in the United States have long had a tool kit that includes
at least the powers described above. Exceeding these considerable
powers by imposing summary punishment, using unnecessary force
to arrest, or disregarding someone's privacy and property rights
without probable cause is generally a violation of local and federal
law. To ignore the limitations on the use of these powers-even by
actions that would not be criminal if carried out by ordinary citi-
zens but which misuse the apparent powers and authority of the
police-is an occasion for department discipline.
What do we know about the success of various tactics using these
powers, reserving for later a discussion of the broad strategies that
are a collection of tactics in Chicago, New York, and Boston?
There is much guesswork in this. Fairly rigorous recent experi-
ments clarify a good deal about what forms of policing actually re-
duce crime. A review of evaluations done by a team at the
University of Maryland for Congress and the Department of Jus-
tice tells us a good deal about what "works. '39
34. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 224 (1973).
35. Green v. Scully, 850 F.2d 894, 903 (2d Cir. 1988).
36. E.g., Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958) (excluding a confession coerced
with the threat of mob violence). Contra Green v. Scully, 850 F.2d 894 (2d Cir. 1988)
(holding a confession voluntary even though the police officer threatened the suspect
with the death penalty, which was not used in New York State at the time).
37. See, e.g., Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 248 n.8 (1979) (upholding elec-
tronic surveillance of all oral communications taking place within a suspect's place of
business).
38. E.g., United States v. McKinnon, 721 F.2d 19, 22-23 (1st Cir. 1983) (affirming a
firearms conviction based on evidence obtained in a drug investigation).
39. Lawrence W. Sherman, Policing for Crime Prevention, in LAWRENCE W. SHER-
MAN ET AL., PREVENTING CRIME: WHAT WORKS, WHAT DOESN'T, WHAT'S PROMIS-
ING: A REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS (1997).
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In Policing for Crime Prevention, Professor Lawrence W. Sher-
man of the University of Maryland analyzes the evaluations of po-
licing strategy. He concludes first that, although the evidence is
inconsistent, the more convincing studies show that an increase in
the number of police causes reductions in crime in the following
year, especially in larger cities with higher crime rates.40 This is
supported by the evidence of epidemics of crime when the police
are on strike41 and by the obvious logic that the presence of more
police increases the risk that an individual committing a crime will
be apprehended, resulting in both a deterrent and an incapacitative
effect.
On the other hand, Sherman finds that rapid response to calls
from victims does not have a significant effect on crime reduction,
when measured against the resources it requires. Too many crimes
are discovered after the fact and even a crime that is discovered
promptly is not affected by rapid response if the time between the
commission of the crime and the initial contact with the police ex-
ceeds nine minutes. Indeed, the average reporting time for such
crimes was forty-one minutes later.42 Nor did random patrol deter
crime by creating a sense of police omnipresence. Among a group
of studies, none of which Sherman deemed especially rigorous, the
stronger studies suggest that there is no such effect.43
What does make a difference, careful evaluations show, is focus-
ing patrol resources on places and times that have the most crime.
The idea is supported by epidemiological research that has shown
that crime tends to be very localized 4 and by careful studies in
Minneapolis suggesting that doubling the police presence led to a
50% decrease in crime in the hot spots, even when the police were
not present.45 It also often led to increased neighborhood calls for
service in the "hot spot" areas.46 As to curfews, not enough is
40. Id. at 8-1.
41. E.g., SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND
ITS PROCESSES 117 (6th ed. 1995) (noting the looting that followed a police strike in
Liverpool in 1919).
42. Sherman, supra note 39, at 8-2.
43. E.g., Robert Trojanowicz, Evaluating a Neighborhood Foot Patrol Program:
The Flint, Michigan Project, in COMMUNITY CRIME PREVENTION: DOES IT WORK?
(Dennis Rosenbaum ed. 1986), cited by Sherman, supra note 39, at 8-3.
44. Sherman, supra note 39, at 8-3 - 8-4 (citing epidemiological studies showing
that crime is localized).
45. Id. at 8-15 (citing Lawrence W. Sherman & David A. Weisburd, General De-
terrence Effects of Police Patrol in Crime "Hot Spots": A Randomized, Controlled
Trial, 12 JUST. Q. 625 (1995)).
46. Sherman, supra note 39 (indicating that crime-related calls for service in-
creased in hot spots as a result of increased police presence).
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known yet to determine whether they are an effective way of re-
ducing crime, particularly among juveniles.
In a related way, concentrating limited police resources on an
identified band of particularly dangerous individuals or crimes also
reduces crime. We know that a small fraction of a total birth co-
hort commits a very high percentage of crimes perpetrated by
members of that cohort. Targeting the more dangerous people had
the hoped-for effect of reducing crime in Washington and Phoe-
nix.47 The case is less clear with regard to targeting dangerous
crimes, with two notable exceptions: seizing guns and drunk driv-
ing.48 Efforts to detect and seize guns have proven to be im-
mensely effective in Kansas City. When gun seizures in a target
area rose by 60%, gun crime dropped by almost 50%. 4 9
There are at least some positive short-term effects of focusing
policing on activities that create a sense of disorder in a neighbor-
hood-tending to support the "Broken Windows ' 50 theory that is
described later.51 But, as in the case of making additional arrests
for misdemeanors and for other crimes for which an individual
might not previously have been arrested (even if caught in the act),
the deterrent and incapacitative effects may be significantly offset
by countervailing long-term effects. Studies show that recidivism
of juveniles increases following arrest.52 The same is true of some
other categories of offenders, such as unemployed men guilty of
domestic violence. 3 There is a reminder in all these statistics that
the long-term effects of invoking the criminal justice system for rel-
atively minor behavior can be to increase rather than reduce crime
through its effect on the life prospects or psychology of the ar-
rested individual.
47. Id. at 8-20 - 8-21 (citing Susan Martin & Lawrence W. Sherman, Selective Ap-
prehension: A Police Strategy for Repeat Offenders, 24 CRIMINOLOGY 55 (1986); Allan
F. Abrahamse et al., An Experimental Evaluation of the Phoenix Repeat Offender
Program, 8 JusT. Q. 141 (1991)).
48. Sherman, supra note 39, at 8-24 (citing James W. Shaw, Community Policing
Against Crime: Violence and Firearms (1994) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Univer-
sity of Maryland (College Park)); Ross Homel, Random Breath Testing and Random
Stopping Programs in Australia, in DRINKING AND DRIVING: ADVANCES IN RE-
SEARCH AND PREVENTION (R.J. Wilson & R. E. Mann eds., 1990)).
49. Sherman, supra note 39, at 8-31 (citing LAWRENCE W. SHERMAN ET AL., NAT'L
INST. OF JUSTICE, THE KANSAS CITY GUN EXPERIMENT (1995)).
50. James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, The Police and Neighborhood Safety:
Broken Windows, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1982, at 29-38.
51. Infra Part III.A.2.
52. E.g., Malcolm Klein, Labeling Theory and Delinquency Policy: An Empirical
Test, 13 CRIM. J. & BEHAV. 47 (1986), cited by Sherman, supra note 39, at 8-16, 8-18.
53. Sherman, supra note 39, at 8-19 (citing several studies).
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As to the specific crime-reduction benefits attributed to consci-
entious efforts to improve police relations with neighborhoods,
Sherman explains: "Neighborhood watch" groups seem to be al-
most wholly ineffective, perhaps because cooperation is least likely
to be found in high crime areas where distrust is widespread, al-
though community meetings can help mobilize citizen participation
in reducing crime. Police visits to citizens' homes are also helpful,
at least among non-minority groups, because they facilitate intelli-
gence gathering and otherwise elicit support for police. Providing
information to the neighborhood rather than eliciting information
from the neighborhood showed no sign of affecting or reducing
crime when it was tried in Newark and Houston. 54 Finally, re-
search consistently demonstrates that individuals who believe that
the police treated them fairly and respectfully in their previous en-
counters are more likely to obey the law in the future.55
Such specific, fact-based arguments are more persuasive than ex-
clusive reliance on the broader contentions that significant changes
in violence must be attributable to changed policing simply because
there were no parallel changes in social conditions that could ex-
plain the drop in violence. In fact, as we have seen, there have
been dramatic changes in social and economic factors, from the
availability of jobs to an end to the growth of the crack market,
which could explain a rapid reduction in violent crime.
Moreover, even small changes in social conditions can result in
dramatic differences in crime or other social phenomena when
there is a contagion effect.56 A small increase in the availability of
guns, for example, could readily result in a geometric increase in
the number of young people feeling they need guns, and these in-
creases could in turn lead to still further geometric increases. We
simply cannot assume that big changes in criminal behavior can
only be brought about by dramatic changes of some other sort.
C. Changes in Public and Political Attitudes Toward Policing
However strong one may find the evidence that new forms of
policing are far more successful in reducing crime of almost every
sort, other than the sale of drugs, the case has been strong enough
and made persuasively enough to create a very substantial change
in expert, official, and public expectations about the crime-reduc-
54. Id. at 8-25 - 8-26.
55. Id. at 8-26, 8-29 (citing an unpublished study).
56. MALCOLM GLADWELL, THE TIPPING POINT: How LITTLE THINGS CAN MAKE
A BIG DIFFERENCE (2000).
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tion and other functions of policing. One way of illustrating that
change is to examine the change in notions about the types of ac-
tions for which the police should be held accountable.
South Africa is one of many countries that measures the effec-
tiveness of its police by their capacity to solve reported crimes and
the speed with which police respond to calls. 57 South African po-
lice claim, unreliably, to have reduced response time to an average
of a very few minutes.58 They are now concentrating on improving
what happens next: detective work relying extensively on ques-
tioning of witnesses and suspects and on forensics.59 In this frame-
work, it makes sense that, in late 1999, the South African police
would only reluctantly take a report from my friend, a driver
whose rear window had been smashed with a brick during an at-
tempted carjacking. Enough time had passed to ensure that the
perpetrators had fled, and my friend could not herself provide a
useful description of the suspects. There was simply no way to
solve such a crime, and, because the police in South Africa are con-
sidered accountable for solving all crimes that have been reported,
the police were not interested in recording information about the
crime.
Law enforcement officials in the United States have learned that
most victims do not call police promptly enough to enable them to
catch the perpetrator at the scene of the crime and that detective
work cannot be relied on to solve the great mass of street crimes.6 °
With that awareness, our policing strategies in the last decade have
turned heavily towards prevention of crimes, using the help of
those in a neighborhood and focusing on general problems rather
than individual events.
Faced with a situation like the attempted carjacking in South Af-
rica, a police department with a prevention-focused strategy would
57. See, e.g., COMM'R OF THE S. AFR. POLICE, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMIS-
SIONER OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE 95 (1993) (employing percentage of crimes
solved as the statistical gauge of police success).
58. See, e.g., Averil Millard, South Africa-Security Industry/CCTV, NATIONAL
TRADE DATA BANK MARKET REPS., Aug. 1, 1999, available in LEXIS, Middle East
and Africa Stories ("Many South Africans have said that they feel the police are too
slow in their response to calls, or they do not respond at all.").
59. See, e.g., Marina Bidoli, Scorpions' Hi-Tech Sting, FIN. MAIL (S. Afr.), June 23,
2000, at 43 (reporting on new technology to help police officers streamline their ef-
forts to track down suspects).
60. E.g., WILLIAM SPELMAN & DALE K. BROWN, CALLING THE POLICE: CITIZEN
REPORTING OF SERIOUS CRIME, at xxiv (1984) (reporting that, of those crimes in
which fast response could make a difference, "only 54 percent ... were likely to be
made in time enough, that is within five minutes, to afford police a reasonable oppor-
tunity to make on-scene arrests").
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want to record and analyze the information; together with informa-
tion on recent and similar events at nearby locations, it would sug-
gest a set of ways that the carjacking activity could be stopped.
Some of these would be imaginative devices for making arrests and
getting convictions, such as sending undercover operatives to the
location or using leverage on people arrested for other crimes in
that area to gather information. A problem-solving police depart-
ment would also consider changing traffic patterns, eliminating the
stop signs that make it possible to smash the window of a stopped
car and immediately reach inside. It might also try to build a com-
munity's support for lawfulness, trust in the police, internal coher-
ence, and "social capital"'6 1 to the point that bystanders in the
neighborhood would help deal with the problem.
Problem-solving policing has received a great deal of credit for
reduced crime. As this has happened, elected officials and the pub-
lic have come to hold the police responsible for reducing crime,
and particularly violence, by dealing with the problems that create
the opportunity or temptation to safely commit crimes that are
dangerous and create fear. In terms of accountability, we have
come to assume that the work of the police can be measured by the
crime rate, not the arrest or conviction rate. Both New York and
Boston have met that standard of accountability remarkably.
If the police are indeed coming to be held accountable for reduc-
ing crime, there is disagreement with regard to another question: to
whom are they accountable? The South African Constitution re-
quires a national police force, accountable to the nation as a
whole.62 In the United States, city police departments are held ac-
countable for the crime figures of cities as large as Boston, Chi-
cago, and New York. But we also believe that they are accountable
to local communities and for developing ways that local communi-
ties can impose social control themselves, assist the police, and fo-
cus the efforts of police and neighborhoods on issues that concern
the neighborhood most. New York attempts to focus responsibility
at the level of each of its seventy-five precincts. Chicago tries to
devolve responsibility down to the level of a beat officer within a
precinct. In short, we are coming to accept the fact that police are
accountable to neighborhoods as well as to cities, and responsible
61. E.g., ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL
OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY (2000) (describing social capital as the collective value of
all social networks and the norms of reciprocity that arise from those networks).
62. S. AFR. CONST. ch. 14, § 214.
2000]
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVIII
for providing what the neighborhood wants as well as for assuring
reduced danger and fear in the city at large.
II. THE NEW POLICING STRATEGIES
All this is the setting for a more detailed exploration of what is
changing in policing, with a particular focus on three major cities at
the forefront of change: Chicago, New York, and Boston. Each
has developed its own variation of the new strategies of policing.
Each has claimed that its variation is best and deserves the most
credit either in terms of reduced crime, increased public acceptabil-
ity of the police, or reduced fear. I will explore each of these strat-
egies and compare their effectiveness with contemporary
developments in the United Kingdom.
A. Chicago and New York
Chicago and New York have taken dramatically different direc-
tions in policing. It is revealing that both would claim to be operat-
ing in the mode of "community policing," a claim that is required
for a city is to get funds from the federal government to increase
the number of its police.63 Both cities' models of policing grow out
of the same historical rejection of three approaches to policing that
had taken on primary importance: random car patrol, rapid re-
sponse to calls for assistance, and skilled investigation of individual
crimes. 64 Both reject what had become the accepted measure of
success: arrest rates.
Not everything about the older model of policing is, in fact,
wrong. Rapid response is necessary when the danger of violent
crime is continuing. Reactive policing and skilled detective work
are, in fact, necessary if the same perpetrator is likely to attack the
same or related victims again. One of the top priorities of policing
is, in the language of Scotland Yard, "preventing repeat victimisa-
tion. ''65 Some significant measure of success in solving dramatic
crimes is important to maintaining social mores, public morale, and
confidence in the police and government. Still, conceding all this,
the limits of reactive policing, and particularly the failures of ran-
63. 42 U.S.C. § 3796dd (1994).
64. George L. Kelling & Mark H. Moore, The Evolving Strategy of Policing,
PERSPS. ON POLICING, Nov. 1988, at 1, 7-9 (identifying these approaches as pillars of
the "reform era," and explaining the reasons why they fell into disfavor in the 1960s
and 1970s).
65. REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF POLICE OF THE METROPOLIS 6 (1998-
1999).
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dom patrol, rapid response, and detective work to meet expecta-
tions required that new strategies be adopted.
I have traveled with the police rapid response team ("flying
squad") in Johannesburg as it rushed from emergency call to emer-
gency call, usually in response to reports of burglaries. There, as in
the United States, the perpetrator was always gone by the time the
few minutes it took the police to arrive was added to the few min-
utes it took the householder to call after the departure of the bur-
glar. Just as the South African police could not use detective work
to solve the attempted carjacking described supra in Part I.C., they
could not use it to solve these burglaries, or, in fact, many other
crimes. Therefore, a different approach to policing is needed.
In the United States, an understanding of the ineffectiveness of
traditional modes of policing, which had been established by
careful experiments,66 came to be reflected in experiments in
neighborhood-based crime control. 67 These neighborhood-based
approaches also addressed the dangers of friction between police
and youth in crime-infested areas, dangers that had exploded in
riots in the late 1960s. The new movements were conceptualized in
1979 in a seminal article by Professor Herman Goldstein calling for
the police to go beyond merely fighting crime and responding to
emergency calls for help and assume the responsibility for finding
solutions to help prevent and reduce a broad range of problems
faced by the community. 68 Communities across the country began
experimenting with various applications of problem-solving
policing.
In the 1980s, three other scholarly developments encouraged the
problem-solving aspect of what was to become the new policing:
the development of clear evidence linking disorder to fear of crime,
the concept of "situational prevention," and the notion of "hot
spots." The first will be discussed infra in connection with New
York. The concept of situational prevention, which originated in
England, is that implementing measures, tailored to particular
66. E.g., GEORGE L. KELLING ET AL., THE KANSAS CITY PREVENTIVE PATROL
EXPERIMENT: A SUMMARY REPORT 1-3 (1974) (recounting an empirical study that
demonstrated, contrary to conventional wisdom of the period, that changes in police
patrol policy had no effect on crime).
67. This sense that traditional modes of policing were ineffective also coincided
with the rise of privately funded security. The causal link between the former and the
latter is certainly open to question, however, as privately funded security has grown
inexorably for many years now. David A. Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 UCLA L.
REV. 1165, 1175 (1999).
68. Herman Goldstein, Improving Policing: A Problem-Oriented Approach, 25
CRIME AND DELINQUENCY 236 (1979).
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crimes and locations, that make the commission of the particular
crime more difficult, risky, or less rewarding, will discourage the
commission of that crime.69
The theory of hot spots developed from research and observa-
tions indicating that a disproportionate percentage of crime is usu-
ally concentrated in small geographical areas, even specific
addresses or locations.7° Identifying hot spots was found to have
two benefits. First, identifying hot spots may allow police to apply
the concept of situational prevention to increase the stakes for
criminal or disorderly behavior in the hot spots, through increasing
police presence in a particular area or increasing community efforts
to watch an area. Second, identifying hot spots allows policing ana-
lysts to use computer technology that can combine the hot spot
locations with detailed maps of the surrounding area to attempt
identification of location features that may help explain the reason
for the high rate of crime.71
Beginning in 1988, under the leadership and sponsorship of Pro-
fessor Mark Moore and then-Attorney General Edwin Meese, a
distinguished group of police chiefs, mayors, academics, and others
met for five years and further developed the "twin poles of modern
policing": (1) encouragement of the participation, at every stage
and in almost every way, of the neighborhood being policed; and
(2) addressing crime as a problem to be solved prospectively, not
as an event to be explained historically by retrospective investiga-
tion and, to whatever extent possible, then remedied by trial and
punishment. 72
1. Chicago
The Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy ("CAPS") started op-
erating in prototype districts in April 1993. Chicago emphasized
the first pole-neighborhood involvement-more completely and
enthusiastically than almost any other city. The immediate schol-
arly background for this neighborhood focus has been the work of
69. Ronald V. Clarke, Situational Crime Prevention: Its Theoretical Basis and
Practical Scope, in 4 CRIME AND JUSTICE: AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF RESEARCH 225
(Michael Tonry & Norval Morris eds., 1983).
70. Lawrence W. Sherman et al., Hot Spots of Predatory Crime: Routine Activities
and the Criminology of Place, 27 CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1989).
71. WESLEY G. SKOGAN ET AL., ON THE BEAT: POLICE AND COMMUNITY PROB-
LEM-SOLVING 16-18 (1999).
72. George L. Kelling, Police and Communities: The Quiet Revolution, PERSPS. ON
POLICING, June 1988, at 1, 8 (describing the Executive Session on Policing and its
members and noting a "quiet revolution" in American policing rooted, in part, in
community involvement and prospective tactics).
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Professor Wesley G. Skogan.73 The more remote scholarly support
is the Chicago criminological tradition of emphasizing the relation
of the demographic and sociological conditions of a neighborhood
to its rate of crime. 4
Current studies by Robert J. Sampson and Felton Earls have ad-
ded greatly to this tradition .7  The studies show convincingly that
the disparity in crime rates within areas of Chicago can be largely
accounted for by measurable neighborhood differences, including,
prominently, differences in those forms of social capital reflected
by constructive involvement in the concerns of neighbors-particu-
larly the willingness to assist in the upbringing of children. The
development of social capital can be encouraged by working with
neighborhood organizations or helping to develop them. It can be
discouraged by allowing fear to force individuals to retreat into
their own houses, away from groups and public places.
The form of policing in Chicago relies extensively on the neigh-
borhood to define the focus of police activities as the police at-
tempt to support social control. If the neighbors are most
concerned about gangs gathering on the street or noise at night,
then these should become police priorities. There is, of course, a
risk that the concerns expressed by the neighbors are shaped by
assumptions about what the police can and cannot do, including
doubts about police capacity to reduce many forms of violence.
Still, there is a powerful democratic claim that neighborhood con-
cerns should be respected as well as an instrumentalist argument
that respecting them empowers the neighborhood, building social
capital and, with that, social control.
This has not been just philosophy. One of CAPS' unique charac-
teristics was the extent to which there was actual, sustained police-
community involvement in identifying problems of concern to the
73. E.g., WESLEY G. SKOGAN & MICHAEL G. MAXFIELD, COPING WITH CRIME:
INDIVIDUAL AND NEIGHBORHOOD REACTIONS (1981); WESLEY. G. SKOGAN, DISOR-
DER AND DECLINE: CRIME AND THE SPIRAL OF DECAY IN AMERICAN NEIGHBOR-
HOODS (1990).
74. E.g., CLIFFORD R. SHAW & HENRY D. McKAY, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY IN
URBAN AREAS 108 (1942); Robert E. Park, Human Ecology, 42 AM. J. Soc. REV. 1
(1937); Ernest Burgess, The Growth of the City: An Introduction to a Research Project,
in THE CITY 47 (Robert E. Park et al. eds., 1925).
75. R. J. Sampson et al., Neighborhoods and Violent Crime: A Multilevel Study of
Collective Efficacy, SCIENCE, Aug. 15, 1997, at 918-24; R. J. Sampson et al., Beyond
Social Capital: Spatial Dynamics of Collective Efficacy For Children, 64 AM. Soc.
REV. 633 (1999).
2000] 425
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVIII
community.76 Community involvement took two forms. The most
fundamental form of neighborhood involvement was the formal
practice of regular meetings between residents and police officers
in every police "beat. '' 77 The practice of regular neighborhood
meetings was taken far more seriously in Chicago than in most cit-
ies with community policing, where public meetings were limited
mostly to initial, kick-off meetings and occasional, poorly-attended
successors.
78
Beat meetings, designed to identify problems of concern to the
particular community and formulate solutions, generally were held
once a month in church basements and park buildings. 79 The
CAPS program encouraged participation of neighborhood organi-
zations such as block clubs, community organizations, client-serv-
ing organizations, churches, and merchants' associations in the
monthly beat meetings, as well as participation by individual re-
sidents. Research on the CAPS program indicates that different
communities do, in fact, have different priorities and concerns.80
Communities also differed significantly in their willingness to be-
come engaged with the CAPS efforts.81
Another way CAPS attempted to use the community to identify
problems, define priorities, identify resources and solutions, and
evaluate the effectiveness of local CAPS efforts was through estab-
lishment of district advisory committees.82 In addition to meeting
with district commanders and staff on a monthly basis, committees
were intended to establish subcommittees to help with the identifi-
cation and evaluation roles of the committees, concentrating on
76. In the CAPS model, a "problem" is understood as a recurring situation or
series of related incidents (unlikely to be resolved on their own) that affect a signifi-
cant portion of the community and can possibly be affected by the resources of the
community and the police. SKOGAN ET AL., supra note 71, at 35.
77. For CAPS purposes, the city's twenty-five police districts were divided into 279
beats, with nine to fifteen beats per district. In 1990, the average beat included 3600
households, or about 9500 residents. Id. at 58.
78. WESLEY G. SKOGAN & ELIZABETH M. HARTNETr, COMMUNITY POLICING,
CHICAGO STYLE 113 (1997).
79. Id. at 55.
80. SKOGAN ET AL., supra note 71, at 30.
Latinos were distinctly concerned about gangs and poor people about the
physical decay of their neighborhoods. Concern about social disorder was
highest in the middle of the income distribution-above the neighborhoods
that were blighted by drugs and gangs but below the best-off places, which
had fewer problems of all kinds to report.
Id.
81. Id. at 30-31.
82. Id. at 29.
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specific needs or areas. In keeping with the flexible, community-
tailored focus of the CAPS vision of community policing, the
makeup of the committees was not established centrally. Rather,
committees were established by district commanders, based on
their view of the most appropriate membership for the district.
Committee members included those active in neighborhood
schools, businesses, churches, and other institutions active in each
neighborhood. Procedural guidelines such as those governing se-
lection of officers, term limits, and voting rights, however, were es-
tablished by the CAPS management team.
There are organizational implications of emphasizing accounta-
bility to neighborhoods. The Chicago policing pushes much of the
responsibility in the organization down to the beat officer, with an
expectation that other department resources and personnel will as-
sist beat officers in their new role.8 3 One of the first responsibili-
ties of the "beat team'"" is to collect beat-specific information,
known as a "beat profile," that is compiled as a tool for problem-
solving and new officer orientation. A beat profile includes infor-
mation on community organizations and resources; descriptions of
problem areas and abandoned buildings; identification of twenty-
four hour businesses, bars, banks, and schools; and other relevant
information gathered from specialized units, such as special gang
units, with knowledge of the beat.
Another new responsibility shared by a beat team is docu-
menting in a "beat plan" the three or four key problems they will
concentrate on in a particular beat. This focuses attention on the
issues until they are resolved, as well as the officers' plans for solv-
ing the problems.86 In formulating the beat plans, officers are ex-
pected to consider resident input that the officers gather from
attendance at beat meetings (another new responsibility). Al-
though the advantages of the beat focus are obvious, one great dis-
advantage, when compared to the New York system, is that
resources at the beat officer's disposal may be too limited to ad-
dress a crime problem that may be much larger than a single beat.
At the same time, the Chicago approach invites the police to ad-
dress non-crime problems as well as crime. The beat officer and his
83. TOGETHER WE CAN: A STRATEGIC PLAN FOR REINVENTING THE CHICAGO
POLICE DEPARTMENT 17 (1993); SKOGAN ET AL., supra note 71, at 59.
84. Beat teams consist of the officers who work in the same beat covering all
three, eight-hour shifts. Each team has roughly nine officers. SKOGAN ET AL., supra
note 71, at 60.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 41, 47.
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superiors focus on problem-solving, including community problems
that are not initially the responsibility of the police, but are within
the control of the city government. The police officer is akin to an
ambassador from the central government of Chicago, able to call
on other parts of the government for a variety of services that can
improve the quality of life in the neighborhood and build social
capital at the same time.87
This notion of problem-solving, which is addressed to a wide
range of problems of the neighborhood as defined by those living
there, contrasts importantly with a strong emphasis on rates of
crime. A broader focus would likely have a less dramatic effect on
violent crime rates, but more satisfactory effects in terms of com-
munity acceptance and, through that, on rates of fear. However,
evidence measuring acceptance by the community and the effec-
tiveness of the CAPS program is mixed. Wesley G. Skogan led a
research effort to evaluate the CAPS program, focusing on fifteen
of the 279 police beats.88 In terms of implementation of problem-
solving, the overall assessment by the evaluation team determined
that of the fifteen beats, "four were doing an excellent job, five
were fielding reasonable programs, two were struggling to make
the grade and four failed to implement much problem solving at
all."8 9 The reasons for relative success or failure seem inextricably
connected to factors such as the personalities, enthusiasm, and
leadership capabilities of the officers.
The variations between the attitudes and efforts of the officers in
the "worst" and "best" beats, in terms of implementation of prob-
lem-solving, are dramatic. The officers and sergeant in the beat
that the evaluation labeled as the "best" actively participated in
beat team and community meetings; developed, implemented, and
followed through with problem-solving strategies; utilized CAPS
procedures and city resources; and responded to community priori-
ties. Interestingly, this beat's population ranked last of all the
beats in terms of being supportive of the police.90 In great contrast,
the "worst" beat team's sergeant and officers had negative or apa-
thetic perspectives on their capacity to effect change, the role of
community beat meetings (seeing them as a forum for complaining
about the police), CAPS paperwork requirements, and community
policing in general (viewing it as public relations). Participation
87. See id. at 36.
88. Id. at 30.
89. Id. at 191.
90. Id. at 192-94.
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and attendance at beat team meetings were sparse and unproduc-
tive; and the officers and sergeant did not utilize the resources
available to them, and utilized CAPS procedures only nominally, if
at all.91 These patterns are consistent with the other "best" and
"worst" beats.92 Other evidence of citizen reactions is discussed
after describing New York's new policing strategies.
2. New York
Wesley G. Skogan also had played an important role as an intel-
lectual father of one of the three central characteristics of New
York's policing. It was his argument in the 1990 book Disorder and
Decline93 that gave credibility to a groundbreaking article by James
Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling, The Police and Neighborhood
Safety: Broken Windows, published in the Atlantic Monthly almost
two decades ago.94 The central argument of Broken Windows was
that disorderly conduct on public streets, something which the po-
lice certainly can control, can undermine social control by frighten-
ing, or otherwise discouraging, responsible citizens from being in
public places and, at the same time, can encourage criminals to be-
lieve that crime would be safe because "obviously, no one at the
scene of disorder cares. ' 95 The exaggerated perceptions of danger
created by disorder were, in themselves, a costly source of fear that
disturbed urban living.
As a matter that was secondary in theory but, perhaps, primary
in practice, "Broken Windows" policing also justified very large
numbers of "frisks" and misdemeanor arrests, which had the twin
benefits of making the illegal carrying of guns far more risky and
increasing stops of dangerous people who were wanted for other
reasons. The case for Broken Windows policing thus relies on both
the fact that disorder creates fear and fear eliminates social control,
inviting activities that may only take place in the absence of social
control, and the fact that focusing on disorderly offenses allows and
invites aggressive street policing.
This model is a form of problem-solving policing, intended to
build social control as well as to use the capacities that the police
already have to deal with dangerous people. At the same time, it is
unlike the Chicago plan in its lack of dependence on any form of
91. Id. at 194-95.
92. See id. at 195-205.
93. SKOGAN ET AL., supra note 71.
94. Wilson & Kelling, supra note 50.
95. Id.
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fact-finding to determine a neighborhood's definition of problems
or any major effort to encourage community participation in their
solution. The New York style of policing involves far more inde-
pendent problem-solving by the police than Chicago's policing, al-
though one of its pillars is the belief, deeply embedded in the
Broken Windows theory, that disorder is a major concern of most
responsible people in any neighborhood.96
While the Broken Windows theory that undergirds this strand of
New York's strategy has won nearly universal acclaim among
scholars, 97 it has not been without detractors. One especially effec-
tive critic has been Professor Bernard E. Harcourt. In a 1998 arti-
cle in the Michigan Law Review, Harcourt replicated Skogan's
analysis and took issue with many of his conclusions. Specifically,
he found that certain types of crimes, including rape, purse snatch-
ing, and pickpocketing, are simply not significantly related to levels
of disorder.98 Moreover, most other types of crime were not re-
lated at a statistically significant level when poverty, stability, and
race were held constant.99 Harcourt similarly took issue with other
empirical evidence cited by proponents of the Broken Windows
theory,100 concluding that the data simply do not support the
hypothesis.'
A second major strand in New York's policing strategies is the
energetic, imaginative use of the full range of police powers and
96. E.g., Randy Kennedy & Alan Feuer, Watchful vs. Worried; Crime Evokes
City's Bad Old Days, But Not Old Fears, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2000, § 1, at 27 (noting
that the Broken Windows theory, which posits a close link between crime and low-
level civic disorder, has been a "big influence on the style of policing that evolved
under [Mayor Rudolph] Giuliani").
97. Bernard E. Harcourt, Reflecting on the Subject: A Critique of the Social Influ-
ence Conception of Deterrence, The Broken Windows Theory, and Order-Maintenance
Policing New York Style, 97 MicH. L. REV. 291, 293 (1998) (stating that "it is today
practically impossible to find a single scholarly article that takes issue with the quality-
of-life initiative. It stands, in essence, uncontested-even in the legal academy").
98. Id. at 327.
99. Id. at 327-28 (finding no significant relationship between disorder and both
burglary and physical assault). Indeed, robbery was the only crime significantly re-
lated to disorder, once poverty, race, and stability were held constant. But, when Har-
court removed a cluster of five Newark neighborhoods from the data, and held
poverty, race, and stability constant, he found no relationship between disorder and
robbery victimization. Id. at 328-29.
100. Id. at 329-31 (finding inconclusive a similar study on the relationship between
crime and disorder) (citing Robert J. Sampson & Jacqueline Cohen, Deterrent Effects
of the Police on Crime: A Replication and Theoretical Extension, 22 L. & Soc. REV.
163 (1988)); Harcourt, supra note 97, at 331-39 (suggesting a number of factors, as
alternatives to the quality of life initiative, that explain the decline in New York City's
crime rates).
101. Harcourt, supra note 97, at 331.
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capacities to deal with crime problems as they arise. Deputy Com-
missioner Jack Maple described the four crucial steps of an effec-
tive police strategy as accurate and timely intelligence, rapid
deployment, effective tactics, and relentless follow-up and assess-
ment. 10 2 A crime problem might be solved by moving more of-
ficers into the area, by addressing its causes, by putting pressure on
people subject to arrest and conviction to provide evidence, by re-
ducing safe opportunities for crime, or in any of a dozen other
ways. The object of this second strand of New York policing is to
ensure that every alternative use of every available police capacity
is considered in order to promptly address what has been identified
as a significant crime problem.
The third notable strand of New York policing is the much ad-
mired and, in fact, remarkable system of management by results
called Compstat. °3 To ensure the conditions of the second
strand-early identification of the problems, careful and imagina-
tive review of tactics involving all police capacities, and very
prompt response-requires assisting precinct commanders with
ideas and, in the New York strategy, powerfully motivating them
with the risk of embarrassment or, worse, loss of the command of a
precinct. Both of these objectives are accomplished by requiring
each of the seventy-five precinct commanders to appear at a very
large meeting of headquarters staff, other precinct commanders,
and prosecutors and be prepared to be examined on any adverse
change in crime statistics in the precinct and to discuss what is be-
ing done about it.' 04 The pressure is substantial, and may be un-
necessary. °5 Part of New York's message may be simply that the
precinct commander should take steps to release and encourage
the natural inclinations of the police officers to go after crime
aggressively.
Although close cooperation with neighborhood groups and reli-
ance on neighborhood leadership has not been a focus of the new
policing in New York, there occasionally have been experiments in
these areas. Even at its most responsive to communities, however,
102. Jack Maple, Editorial, Brutality Isn't Part of New Tactics, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21,
1997, § 13, at 17.
103. David C. Anderson, Crime Stoppers, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Feb. 9, 1997, at 47
(describing how each precinct's crime statistics are electronically inputted into the
Compstat system each week, allowing senior officials to analyze police and criminal
activity throughout the city in a timely fashion).
104. Id.
105. Boston's management system examines what is happening and what could be
done in a far less confrontational way.
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it has never approached the aims or practices of Chicago's CAPS
program.
3. Results in New York and Chicago
What do we know about the results in New York and Chicago?
The experiences in both cases remind us that results on the street
may depart from strategies. Sometimes Chicago could not develop
neighborhood policing in one beat, although it was successful in an
adjacent beat. New York has experienced a number of very dra-
matic and inflammatory instances of police abuse, which were cer-
tainly not planned as part of its strategy, °6 and its efforts at
developing creative community relations in the 75th Precinct also
seem exceptional and far from integral to its core strategies. 10 7
Moreover, in each case, the studies evaluating each city's new po-
licing approach were conducted within a very few years of the initi-
ation of the strategy; that may be too soon to know the long-term
consequences. But it is important to look at what we know now
about two dimensions: effectiveness in reducing crime and the abil-
ity of the police to develop trust within the community being
policed.
In 1998, two arms of the Department of Justice (the Office of
Community-Oriented Policing Services and the Bureau of Justice
Statistics) produced a groundbreaking victimization survey of re-
sidents of twelve cities, including Chicago and New York. °8 Ques-
tions went both to the level of crime, fear, and disorder and to the
attitudes of citizens toward the police.
New York had more serious crime problems than Chicago but
was making more progress in dealing with them. In 1998, Chicago
106. E.g., Jeffrey Rosen, Excessive Force, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 10, 2000, at
2427 (suggesting that defenders of the zero tolerance policy against crime believe that
it has an inevitable side effect of aggressive policing); George L. Kelling, Policing
Under Fire, WALL ST. J., Mar. 23, 1999, at 22 (suggesting that "root-cause liberals"
feel that police perhaps can reduce crime, but only at a cost of abusing citizens); Jack
Newfield, Rudy, It's Time to Listen to This Voice of Reason, N.Y. POST, Feb. 16, 1999,
at 20 (quoting Urban League President Dennis Walcott as saying that "there needs to
be a balance between aggressive police work and respect for civil liberties and dignity
of the people who get stopped and searched"); Liza Mundy, Broken Windows, WASH.
POST MAG., June 11, 2000, at 4 (commenting that ordinary citizens are appalled at
how aggressive policing led to the shooting deaths of two unarmed black men).
107. Harvey Simon & John Buntin, The East New York Urban Youth Corps and
Community Policing: A New Initiative in the "Dead Zone" (1999) (unpublished man-
uscript written for John F. Kennedy School of Government Case Program); John
Buntin, The Community Security Initiative Gets Underway (1998) (unpublished man-
uscript written for John F. Kennedy School of Government Case Program).
108. COMMUNITY SAFETY, supra note 13.
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had 68 violent victimizations per 1000 residents twelve-years-old or
older; in New York, there were far more, with a rate of 85 per
1000.109 The black violent victimization rate in Chicago in 1998
was 50 per 1000 citizens for violent crime; in New York it was 123
per 1000.110 A violent victimization in New York was almost twice
as likely to involve a weapon.111 But during the period 1993-97,
homicides in Chicago decreased by about 10%.112 In New York,
homicides declined by more than 60% from 26.5 per 100,000 to
10.5 per 100,000.113
In both Chicago and New York in 1998, residents were far more
likely to fear crime in their city than in their neighborhood or on
their street.'14 Obviously, the likelihood fears are exaggerated in-
creases as firsthand evidence declines. Both in respondents' neigh-
borhoods and in their cities, there was slightly more fear in
Chicago than in New York.115 Moreover, 25% of the respondents
in Chicago said they were more frightened than they had been a
few years earlier while only 15% in New York were more
frightened. 116
As might be expected with Broken Windows policing, a slightly
smaller percentage of the population in New York reported public
drinking or drug use, public drug sales, vandalism, graffiti, prostitu-
tion, and panhandling in their neighborhood. 117 In Chicago, 36%
of the residents said that conditions of disorder or activities of the
sort I have just described made them feel less safe." 8 This was true
of only 29% in New York.119
Meanwhile, 74% of the residents in Chicago reported themselves
either very or somewhat fearful of crime in their city. 120 Only a
somewhat smaller figure, 68%, reported the same in New York.' 2 '
While most people in both cities felt that their fear had not
109. Id. at iv.
110. Id. at 3 tbl.1.
111. Id. at 5 tbl.5.
112. Id. at 9.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 10.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 12 tbl.1M.
117. Id. at 15 tbl.16.
118. Id. at 16 tbl.17.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 18 tbl.20.
121. Id.
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changed much, there was a somewhat greater percentage of those
who felt reduced fear in New York. a1 2
Reports on trust-building relations with the police were also re-
vealing, but cut the other way: 67% of residents in Chicago and
only 51% of New York residents said the police were doing com-
munity policing. 123 Perhaps relatedly, 38% of Chicagoans, com-
pared to 23% of New Yorkers, had heard about a meeting
concerning crime in their neighborhood in 1998.124 Along all the
following dimensions, a somewhat higher percentage of those from
Chicago, than from New York, had contact with the police: casual
conversation, calling the police for service, providing information
to the police, reporting a crime to the police, asking for advice
from the police, and participating in community activity with the
police.125 A significantly higher percentage of New York residents
felt there was an increased police presence in their neighborhood;
it just took a different form.12 6
The Chicago police elicited more satisfied reactions from the vic-
tims of violent crimes than New York police and a significantly
higher percentage of Chicago residents said that the police were
doing a lot of work with the neighborhood residents to prevent
crime and safety problems. 27 This is far more at the heart of the
Chicago strategy than the New York strategy. In Chicago, 73% of
city residents were familiar with the term "community policing, 1 28
as compared to just 50% of New Yorkers, a revealing fact in
itself.' 2
9
One survey question combined concern about crime and concern
about the police. Residents in both cities were very satisfied with
local police.130 Not surprisingly, blacks in both Chicago and New
York were less satisfied with the local police than were whites. 31
But despite several notorious incidents of police brutality in New
York, blacks there were more satisfied with the local police than
were blacks in Chicago, by a margin of 77% to 69%.132
122. Id.
123. Id. at 28.
124. Id. at 22 tbl.26.
125. Id. at 23 tbl.20.
126. Id. at 24 tbl.31.
127. Id. at 24 tbl.32.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 1998, at 110 tbl.2.27 (1999).
131. Id.
132. COMMUNITY SAFETY, supra note 13, at 25 tbl.34.
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B. Boston
Boston was not part of the Department of Justice survey of
twelve cities. Its strategies are different from those of both New
York and Chicago-different not only in attempting to combine
parts of the strategies of each other city, but also in making very
different use of problem-solving than New York and a very differ-
ent use of neighborhood cooperation than Chicago. The rate of
homicide reduction in Boston in the 1990s was nearly as dramatic
as that in New York.133
It is worth reviewing the events that led Boston to embrace the
community-policing model. Already widely criticized for overly
aggressive street patrols, in the late 1980s the Boston Police De-
partment encountered public outrage when it was revealed that of-
ficers, faced with the sudden emergence of crack cocaine, were
indiscriminately stopping and searching young black men. The
"stop and frisk" scandal came to a head in the fall of 1989, when,
based on widespread suspicion that police routinely used unconsti-
tutional searches and seizures, a Dorchester judge suppressed evi-
dence he believed had been obtained improperly.1
3 1
That same year, Carol Stuart, a pregnant white woman, was mur-
dered near a largely African American part of Boston.135 Her hus-
band Charles, a witness to the crime, reported that an African
American male committed the murder. Based on this account, the
Boston Police Department aggressively pursued suspects from the
area, eventually eliciting witness statements that incriminated a lo-
cal black resident. These charges were shown to be false when
Charles Stuart was later implicated as the murderer. Stuart killed
himself before the investigation could be completed. The wide-
spread reports of police abuse, coupled with the appearance of ra-
cism within the department, exacerbated public hostility towards
the police, particularly within the African American community.
133. Fox Butterfield, Cities Reduce Crime and Conflict Without New York-Style
Hardball, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2000, at Al (noting that, according to Professor Blum-
stein, New York's homicide rate fell 70.6% from 1991 to 1998, while Boston's rate fell
69.3% during the same period).
134. E.g., Doris Sue Wong, Search-on-Sight Judged Illegal, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug.
30, 1989, at B1 (reporting that Suffolk Superior Court Judge Cortland A. Mathers
dismissed weapons possession indictments against two suspected gang members, be-
cause the evidence seized pursuant to the search-on-sight policy had been illegally
obtained).
135. E.g., Michael Rezendes, Mayor's Reputation as Racial Healer Gets Some Tar-
nish, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 10, 1991, at 1.
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Recognizing that it needed approaches that were more effective
and less divisive, the Boston Police Department implemented a va-
riety of problem-solving and community-policing strategies. The
most notable problem-solving strategy in Boston is what David
Kennedy, of Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Gov-
ernment, has called "Pulling Levers. ' 136 In contrast to Broken
Windows, it has not made misdemeanor arrests or stop and frisks a
key to reduced homicides by increasing the risks of carrying guns,
the most lethal weapon. Pulling Levers is instead based on a form
of deterrence that is new and yet grounded in a very old theory.
For some centuries, it has been accepted that certainty and swift-
ness of punishment are more likely to be effective in changing con-
duct than longer penalties imposed without certainty or speed.
This may be particularly true for youthful, violent offenders who
are likely to discount sharply both the chance of getting caught and
the costs of future punishment and who may know little about ac-
tual punishments. Working with the Boston police, Kennedy
found, from a careful review of homicide files, that violence in Bos-
ton was heavily concentrated, on both the perpetrator's and the
victim's side, in gang members and among those with long arrest
records.137 Kennedy also found, not surprisingly, that the identities
of youth with these characteristics were well-known to the po-
lice.1 38 (In fact, police in many cities believe that the number of
dangerous perpetrators is relatively small and that their identities
are known.)
The Boston police discovered that youth in the dangerous cate-
gories potentially were subject to a large number of sanctions and
inconveniences of one sort or another. In Kennedy's words:
The Boston Gun Project Working Group observed that gangs
and gang members left themselves open to an enormous range
of sanctions, exactly because they were so highly criminal. Gang
members committed large numbers of crimes that were open to
ready police enforcement: they sold drugs on the street and they
committed large numbers of disorder offenses like drinking and
using drugs in public, trespassing, and the like. Gangs and gang
members were often the subject of longer-term enforcement at-
tention, such as undercover drug investigations .... They were
frequently on probation, sometimes on parole, and they rou-
tinely violated their conditions of probation and parole, which
136. David M. Kennedy, Pulling Levers: Chronic Offenders, High-Crime Settings,
and a Theory of Prevention, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 449 (1997).
137. Id. at 452.
138. Id.
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could include curfews, area restrictions, restrictions on how
many and which people they could associate with, abstinence
from alcohol and other drugs, and the like. They were often out
on bail awaiting trial or sentencing, with similar conditions
which were similarly frequently violated. Juvenile offenders
were often under formal Department of Youth Services (DYS)
supervision but still living in the community. And gangs and
gang members were often implicated in large numbers of "cold"
cases such as unsolved assaults and homicides.' 39
Therefore, the threat of swift and certain sanctions could be con-
veyed in person to the individuals whose conduct had to be
changed. Absent evidence of a serious crime, which could be diffi-
cult to find, the police otherwise might not be able to prevent all
the anti-social or criminal conduct of an individual specifically
warned of the amount of attention and the range of sanctions to
which he would be subject. But the sanctions proved adequate to
prevent any particular type of conduct, for example, violence. In-
deed, violence often may be something that young people would
like to avoid if it would be possible to do so without losing face. In
any event, violent activity was less important and more easily aban-
doned than profit-making activities, which would be threatened by
police attention.
Thus, the overall strategy is clear and persuasive. If, as was true
in Boston, an identifiable group of individuals is known or reasona-
bly believed to be responsible for a large percentage of a particular
type of crime, and if they are individually subject to a wide range of
sanctions, then it should be possible to prevent them from engaging
in any type of criminal behavior that is not of central importance to
them by making clear, in face-to-face contact, that all available
sanctions will be brought to bear if they engage in the prohibited
conduct. Violent youth fall within that category, as do the crimes
of violence that Boston was determined to stop. The strategy
would work so long as the critical neighborhoods-those that were
home to the youth subject to highly specific and threatening orders
to give up violence-were supportive and did not regard the polic-
ing strategy as unfair or discriminatory. Finding that support,
which New York had done much less well, was one of the objec-
tives of the other, neighborhood-based, part of Boston's policing
strategy.
Crucial to Boston's efforts to develop community support was
the police department's partnership with the Ten Point Coalition
139. Id. at 461 (citation omitted).
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(the "Coalition"), a prominent group of local black clergy, mem-
bers of which had made a name for themselves by taking their min-
istries to Boston's most dangerous streets.' 40 Despite historically
tense relations, the two groups began to work together once they
recognized their mutual need: the ministers' attempts to reach at-
risk youth were undermined by committed offenders who contin-
ued to run the streets, while the police department's plans to im-
plement community-based strategies depended on the
participation and acceptance of community members who did not
trust them. Much of Boston's success in lowering crime and devel-
oping community support arises from the credibility the depart-
ment developed by virtue of its association with the Coalition. This
credibility has endured in large part because the Coalition, while
cooperative, has remained a distinct entity not afraid to criticize
police action.141 As a community watchdog, the Coalition has
helped keep the police accountable and deterred abuses akin to
those that have plagued New York in recent years.
The community-based activities, which are an integral part of
Boston's strategy, can be illustrated by practices in the Dorchester
neighborhood, a policing precinct of which the Boston police are
particularly proud. They take two forms: (1) modes of serious and
continuous consultation with citizens; and (2) demonstrations of
concern for the well-being of young people getting in trouble, in-
stead of just recrimination.
Serious consultation began with citywide strategic planning with
local priorities to be set by teams in each police district that were
led by the district commander, but the membership of which was
divided between police and concerned, involved citizens. Real
power was devolved from headquarters so that the district com-
mander could work in close association with citizen stakeholders.
In the Dorchester district, for example, Captain Robert Dunford
gives his neighborhood advisory council significant influence, even
over budget allocations and patrol plans. 142 Within each district,
140. E.g., Charles A. Radin & Jamal E. Watson, Activists Revisit Gang Strategy:
Some See Complacency As Youth Violence Increases In Boston, BOSTON GLOBE, Sep.
5, 2000, at Al.
141. E.g., Judy Rakowsky, Black Leaders Assail Martin, Urge Tougher Hate-Crimes
Efforts; DA Defends Office's Record, Rebuts Report, BOSTON GLOBE, June 14, 2000,
at B3 (explaining that Coalition member Rev. Eugene Rivers criticized police for a
1997 change of policy in classifying hate crimes).
142. The two paragraphs that follow draw on Evan S. Reynolds, Neighborhood Po-
licing in Boston: A Dorchester Case Study 9-13, 23-36 (Apr. 30, 1999) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author).
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"team leaders" are assigned specific responsibility for the unique
problems of a particular beat.
The neighborhood orientation in Dorchester is maintained on a
daily basis by four community service officers, each of whom is as-
signed to interact with neighborhood groups in a particular beat-
explaining, learning, relaying concerns, and recruiting participation
in a shared "Project Safeguard" to provide neighborhood safety.
Finally, even prosecution is made subject to community influence
in still another program, the Dorchester Safe Neighborhood Initia-
tive, which is counseled in part by an advisory board consisting of
local residents as well as police and prosecutors.
The second strand of Boston's strategy is a demonstrated con-
cern for the well-being of youth already getting into trouble. What
the Boston police avoid is a sense that they are the dangerous ene-
mies of all but the well-behaved among youth in struggling neigh-
borhoods. Adopting the mixed concerns of relatives of youth who
form much of the community, the police are determined to make
the life of salvageable youth better, not harder. Thus, Commis-
sioner Paul Evans uses a federal block grant to pay for clinical so-
cial workers, who are attached to police districts such as
Dorchester, to advise, support, and introduce to useful programs
those youth who have been referred to them by police.143 They
maintain confidentiality and appear in court for the youth where
this seems appropriate to the case. Districts like Dorchester also
have juvenile justice "roundtables" that involve the police, district
attorney, schools, social services, and others in regular discussions
of what is happening in the lives of certain troubled youth in an
effort to find help for them and to coordinate governmental
responses. 144
The Boston strategy had organizational implications. While
some New York precinct commanders found Compstat meetings
harsh and threatening, Commissioner Evans expected district com-
manders in Boston to carry out their plans in highly decentralized
ways, and that was communicated through meetings that were less
confrontational than those in New York.1 45 His role was to decide
whether to approve a plan and then support and monitor it.
143. Id. at 14-15.
144. Id. at 20-23.
145. Id. at 3 (reporting that Commissioner Evans pursued decentralization as an
avenue toward accountability).
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In sum, by taking a hard line against those individuals who com-
mit most crime, and working in tandem with critical neighbor-
hoods, Boston was able to achieve dramatic crime reductions.
C. England and Wales
One final strategy, distinct but related to those I have described,
deserves attention as well, for it combines central elements of all
three strategies discussed thus far. Like Chicago's strategy, the
crime legislation introduced by British Prime Minister Tony Blair's
Labour Party relies powerfully on the wishes of neighborhood re-
sidents and depends upon them to initiate action. 146 Like New
York, Britian focuses attention on disorderly and fear-generating
actions that are threatening to individuals; but instead of using stat-
utes that broadly prohibit a type of conduct (such as drinking alco-
holic beverages on the street), Britain has turned to far more
specific requirements that are addressed only to certain named in-
dividuals.1 47 Like Boston's strategy, the new provisions specifically
target troublesome individuals who are not subject to present pros-
ecution because of lack of evidence of an immediate crime.148 But
the British prohibitions include efforts to deter behavior far less
serious than the lethal violence that was the target of Boston's
strategy. 149
England and Wales' Crime and Disorder Act of 1998150 creates
something called an "anti-social behavior order." Either the police
or the local government can apply for such an order from a magis-
trate's court. The defendant does not have to be present at the
proceedings, which are civil rather than criminal and operate under
a preponderance of the evidence rule. If the defendant is found to
have acted "in a manner that caused, or was likely to cause harass-
ment, or alarm, or distress to one or more persons not of the same
household as himself" and if the defendant cannot establish that
his or her behavior was reasonable in the circumstances, a court
order to protect the people in the local government area for a mini-
146. Andrew Rutherford, An Elephant on the Doorstep: Criminal Policy Without
Crime in New Labour's Britian, in CRIMINAL POLICY IN TRANSITION 36, 64 (P. Green
& A. Rutherford eds., forthcoming 2000).
147. Id. at 37.
148. Id. at 66-67.
149. E.g., Russell Jenkins, Peeping Tom Jailed Under New Law, TIMES (London),
June 23, 2000, at 7 (describing a mandatory jail sentence for subsequent crimes com-
mitted by sex offenders, who are required by the Crime and Disorder Act to register
with law enforcement).
150. Crime and Disorder Act 1998, Royal Assent 27 (1999).
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mum of two years (with no maximum) is to be issued, prohibiting
the individual from doing anything or being anywhere described in
the order. Violating the order without a reasonable excuse is an
indictable offense, which carries as much as a five-year prison term.
There is no requirement that the defendant have intended to
harass or to cause alarm and distress. Nor is there any requirement
that the alarm or distress be "serious." Moreover, the activities
giving rise to the order are intended to be broader than the acts
prohibited by the criminal law. In effect, a magistrate's court can
deal with people it determines to be engaged in frightening behav-
ior by developing an injunctive law of its own, a violation of which
is punishable criminally. The primary explanation for bypassing
general requirements of the criminal law in this way is that there
are courses of conduct that involve an accumulation of events,
none of which is itself criminal but which together warrant severe
measures.' The resulting deterrence is even more specific and fo-
cused than Boston's Pulling Levers.
HI. THE PROBLEM OF LEGITIMACY
How could anyone complain about such imaginative and appar-
ently successful policing as has taken place, for example, in New
York? The answer is that, in exchange for quite remarkable im-
provements in personal security, we are accepting reductions in
democratic control and thus the legitimacy of the purposes for
which the powers of the police can be used. We are endorsing sig-
nificant reductions in control over the discretion of the police in
choosing specific targets. We are moving toward a regime of polic-
ing where the notions of equal protection have limited force on the
ground. We also increasingly are finding that probable cause and
reasonable suspicion as predicates for detention and search are be-
ing eroded, and that the very determination of what conduct will
be permitted and what form of disorder is subject to prompt sanc-
tions is left in far larger part to the police. Therefore, this evalua-
tion must count the costs as well as the considerable benefits of the
new policing.
A. The Problem of the Democratic Legitimacy of the Goals for
which Police Powers are Used
In describing the successes of the new policing, I have implicitly
assumed that its goal was to reduce serious crime on a citywide
151. Rutherford, supra note 146, at 63.
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basis. It is time to examine whether this is, in fact, accepted as the
goal of the new policing and, if not, what is? Indeed, a prior ques-
tion remains unanswered: who is to set the goals?
1. The Inevitability of Discretion
To be clear at the start, the police have many responsibilities be-
yond reducing crime. They prevent fights, regulate demonstra-
tions, enforce traffic regulations, engage in rescue or other
assistance, and much more. I have focused on the crime reduction
benefits of the new policing and the neighborhood trust that it can
induce because these have been the major subjects of attention in
bringing about the changes that have occurred since 1990, not be-
cause they are the only significant functions of a modern, urban
police department. Second, unavoidably there are critical choices
to be made as to goals, even in the more limited area of dealing
with the effects of crime on continuing danger, public fear, social
control in neighborhoods, and public resentment of disorder.
Governments of civil law countries from Argentina to France
and Germany sometimes act as if there is not a serious question as
to the purposes for which police powers like those described above
can be used, contending that the police officer is obligated to arrest
whenever he sees a crime and then to take investigative steps at the
order of a judge whom the officer, carrying out another legal obli-
gation, must notify immediately of the crime and the suspect. 152
Thus, in 1999, Klaus Hubmann, the senior public prosecutor in Nu-
remberg, Germany, explained that he had no choice but to investi-
gate a failed attempt fifty-three years earlier by two Jewish
survivors of the Holocaust to poison members of Adolf Hitler's
SS,153 Hubmann explained that political or moral aspects could
play no part in the decision. Civil law countries deny that their
police have the discretion, so readily accepted in the United States,
not only to decline to arrest in very sympathetic situations but also
to develop imaginative uses of police powers for such purposes as
reducing disorder, preventing violence, building social control, and
152. E.g., Richard S. Frase & Thomas Weigend, German Criminal Justice as a
Guide to American Law Reform: Similar Problems, Better Solutions?, 18 B.C. INT'L &
COMP. L. REV. 317, 337 n.135 (1995) (noting that "German police have no legal dis-
cretion to drop or to refrain from investigating arguably criminal cases").
153. Louise Potterton, Germany Pursues Holocaust Avengers, SUN. TELEGRAPH
(London), Oct. 10, 1999, at 7.
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carrying out whatever are the wishes of members of .a
community.154
This denial of discretion is surely a fiction in almost every coun-
try in the world. The police officer is forced to decide on what
occasions he or she should use these powers for two major reasons.
First, in every country, what crimes an officer will be in a position
to act upon depend upon where the officer is and what he or she is
looking for, and this involves discretion. Second, if the officer
comes upon a minor matter that is criminal, he has to decide
whether it is worth his time, and the time of prosecutors and judi-
cial officials, to process the matter. In the United States, we are
very frank about such uses of judgment or discretion by individual
police officers or, sometimes, by the police department in the form
of directives to officers.
In short, it is wholly implausible to assume that the goal in the
United States is to enforce all the criminal statutes enacted by state
and federal legislatures. The larger part of violations of the law by
270 million Americans must be ignored by the fewer than one
million police, who do not have time to investigate matters they
consider unimportant. 55 Moreover, these officers know that pros-
ecutors and judges will lack the capacity to try cases if all the small
matters are brought to court, and that juries are likely to reject as
excessive the use of the criminal law in those cases. We have come
to assume that even statutes recently passed by a concerned legisla-
ture will be applied with discretion as to their use.156
2. Traditional Understandings and New Choices
It is how this discretion is used-not any novelty or recognition
of the need for it-that has taken new shape as policing has
154. E.g., Richard S. Frase, Comparative Criminal Justice as a Guide to American
Law Reform: How Do the French Do It, How Can We Find Out, and Why Should We
Care?, 78 CAL. L. REV. 542, 555-57 (1990) (noting that France requires "supervisory-
level approval" for certain creative uses of police power "which American law gener-
ally permits any police officer to undertake on his or her own").
155. Cf U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Population Clocks, http://www.census.gov/popula-
tion/www (providing the population of the United States as 276,351,651) (current
through Dec. 19, 2000); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, SURVEY OF PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT
AND PAYROLL 1999, U.S. SUMMARY TABLE (providing the total number of police in
the United States), http://www.census.gov/govs/www/apesst/99.html.
156. E.g., Task Force on Federalization of Criminal Law, The Federalization of
Criminal Law, 11 FED. SENTENCING REP. 194, 194 (Jan./Feb. 1999) ("[The Task Force]
looked systematically at whether new federal criminal laws, which were popular when
enacted, are being enforced. It determined, based on obvious data, that in many in-
stances they are not.").
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changed. Until a few decades ago, it was understood that police
discretion-use of limited police resources-would be rationed by
the seriousness of the conduct that was being investigated. This
seriousness was in turn dictated by the people's representatives in
the legislature, who used sentencing levels to express their relative
disapproval of criminal conduct. The assumption, in other words,
was that there was a direct correlation between the sentence im-
posed and the citizenry's view (as expressed through its elected
representatives) of the relative seriousness of the conduct. As long
as police relied upon sentences as guidelines to seriousness-and,
for the most part, they did-there was a strong democratic compo-
nent to their enforcement decisions. Thus, police ignored minor,
regulatory offenses or left them underpoliced and, therefore, un-
derdetected. The measures of police performance we developed,
focusing on FBI statistics as to a few serious crimes, also reflected
that judgment. In recent decades, the focus has come to include,
besides punishing individual crimes, incapacitating dangerous crim-
inal groups ranging from organized crime to terrorists to street
gangs. But what qualified a group for attention was still the seri-
ousness of the conduct in which it engaged: political violence, or-
ganized street violence, corruption of officials, intimidation, and
extortion.
Both traditional assumptions about the goals or ends of policing
and assumptions about how the available means or powers will be
used to accomplish whatever goals are chosen have been brought
into question by the new policing. Leaving changes in assumptions
about means until later, we should focus first on the question of
legitimacy of goals.
Consider the issues presented by problem-solving policing.
What problems should be given priority? The menu of possible
"problems" of street crime the police might decide to address
includes:
1. Forms of particularly harmful violence such as homicides,
rape, or regular intimidation by organized crime, gangs, or
individuals;
2. All violence;
3. Activities that create fear in many people or otherwise dis-
courage social control, such as the disorder coming from
open-air drug markets;
4. All forms of drug trafficking; or
5. The security of property against even non-violent theft.
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Moreover, these and perhaps other categories of crime are more
or less important, depending on the place, time, and victims of the
crime. So, the choice is among at least five categories of crime with
at least three variations of each. In fact, after some discussion, one
might well want to increase the number of choices to well beyond
these fifteen variations.
3. Whose Views Should Priorities Reflect?
With these reasonable contenders for priority in policing, a criti-
cal question becomes: whose views of the importance of each cate-
gory should control? Again, there are a number of alternatives.
Whatever category the police leadership considers most important
might be critical. To set limits on acceptable goals, we might want
to forbid decisions that seem intended to favor or disfavor the in-
terests of an identifiable group or class, such as failing to investi-
gate powerful political figures or concentrating police effort in
wealthy neighborhoods and failing to provide adequate policing in
poor neighborhoods, or-a contentious issue-projecting the views
of the police, without any popular basis for the choice, as to such
issues as fear of crime or what suppressing disorder requires.
A second alternative is the prioritization of categories of crime
according to whatever the police think that the majority of the citi-
zens of the city want addressed, regardless of the views of the peo-
ple in the immediate neighborhood where the problem exists and
the policing is to occur. A closely related alternative is that priority
should go to whatever problems the mayor wants addressed, for he
or she is the duly elected supervisor of the police.
Another alternative is to give priority to whatever problems the
police believe the people in the particular neighborhood want ad-
dressed. This could be defined in several different ways: "the re-
spectable leadership of the neighborhood" (where the definition of
respectable may amount to police selection of acceptable behav-
ior); those in the neighborhood who volunteer to work with the
police; or the majority of residents of the neighborhood, although
there is generally no available process for determining majority
views in a neighborhood.
Some of these ways of setting priorities are more democratic
than others, either in the effort by the police to decide whose con-
cerns are to be valued or in the making of the actual choice by one
or another of different groups. But even in the more democratic
methods, deep problems lurk. For example, the police may not be
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very good at determining the views of the majority of the public,
however we define the relevant public.
As always, the size of the constituency also matters. We know
from surveys that people generally believe their own neighbor-
hoods to be far safer than they believe the entire city to be.'57 The
people outside a neighborhood area are thus more likely to be in-
fluenced by fear, even if exaggerated, and by the immense effect of
rare but dramatic crimes as described by the media. Neighborhood
majorities are likely to have different attitudes than majorities of a
far larger, citywide jurisdiction.
Even if the decision is made to focus on the views of local com-
munities that are smaller than entire cities, the result is likely to
depend on how one defines a neighborhood. But the hardest prob-
lem is deciding whose views matter. The fact is that different
groups want different things. The young and the old are likely to
have different attitudes toward disorder. Minorities in a city are
likely to have different attitudes than majorities. Most dramati-
cally, the problem can be illustrated by the question: what value
should be given to the concerns of rebellious minority youth in an
urban slum? Some have treated this group as entitled to concern;
others have regarded this group as the object, not the beneficiary,
of policing.
In sum, problem-solving policing, whether or not it takes its
goals from those living in a particular neighborhood, requires
choice among a variety of goals. Even assuming that the objective
is to choose goals democratically, so that the police are acting in
the name of those affected by their policing, there is no agreed-
upon definition of whose concerns are to be valued, how they are
to be determined, and what is to be done when those affected have
inconsistent concerns.
It may not be possible to resolve these questions persuasively in
terms of some political philosophy. But it is certainly dangerous, in
terms of democratic values, to leave these questions unaddressed.
That is a dangerous characteristic of the new policing.
B. The Risk of Misuse of Police Powers
For many people, the police represent not only protection
against the predatory conduct of one's neighbor, but also a source
of fear themselves. The fear may be of brutality by the only legiti-
mate armed force in the community or of the embarrassment of
157. COMMUNITY SAFETY, supra note 13, at 18, 25.
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being treated, particularly in public, without dignity or respect by
members of an organization that represents the authority and the
power of the state. Or the fear may be of intrusiveness into areas
of privacy that one prefers to reserve for oneself and intimates.
Because of these fears, we have come to expect more from the po-
lice than effectiveness in pursuing even carefully chosen goals.
We expect, first, a concern about maintaining a healthy relation-
ship between the citizen and the authority and power of the state;
in other words, a respect for the liberty and privacy of individuals.
Second, we demand an absence of bias in the use of the powers I
have described, for assertions of police authority and force that are
systematically biased against a racial, religious, or ethnic group
convey a powerful message of second-class citizenship. Bias
against political opponents of the police or their political supervi-
sors is also a terrible threat to a vital democracy. We expect, third
and most broadly, to be accorded the respect that a citizen de-
serves in a citizen-ruled democracy-respect displayed in the way
individuals are addressed and handled, particularly in front of
others. To protect all these expectations, we depend on the visibil-
ity and reviewability of significant decisions by police officers.
In some conflict with these three expectations, the new policing,
in many of its manifestations, involves tactics and strategies which
are likely to: increase the power of the state at the expense of the
capacity of citizens to avoid or resist that power; invite the use of
discretion in ways that are more likely to reveal bias than the older
forms of policing; and increase the likelihood of particular groups
of people being subjected to embarrassment, and treated without
respect on the streets. At the same time, the new forms of policing
almost are designed to be carried out beneath the radar of visibility
on which accountability depends. Thus, there is a price to be paid
for the great potential of the new forms of policing, but the price
can be reduced by carefully addressing issues of accountability.
1. Citizen and State: Civil Liberties
Consider the effect of the new policing on the efforts of the last
half-century to control the relationship of the state to the individ-
ual and, in particular, of a police officer to a citizen. The specific
fears during that period focused on police abuse of the powers to
search, arrest, and interrogate. In the 1960s, the United States Su-
preme Court insisted that all of these powers, even when exercised
by local police officers, must satisfy specific conditions-probable
cause or reasonable suspicion and the Miranda rules-or else any
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evidence flowing from the action would be excluded from trial. 158
The assumption was that there would be little incentive to violate
the Court's rules if the information could not be used at trial. A
somewhat more lenient standard was sufficient to justify a stop or
frisk of an individual (reasonable and articulable suspicion),'159 and
a somewhat stricter standard was applicable to electronic
surveillance. 160
Because these standards required the police to show that, before
acting, they had evidence of a crime (and since the focus of policing
was on very serious crimes), there has been practically no use of
the Equal Protection Clause to guarantee that minorities are not
treated differently; after all, citizens could not be subject to these
police powers at all unless there was an adequate basis to believe
they had committed what was generally a serious crime. And there
was a final protection of which we were very proud: the police
could not arrest or search at all if the basis for that activity-the
definition of the criminal conduct of which the police needed evi-
dence-was so general and encompassing in its coverage or so
vague in what it forbade that it left the police officer with the wid-
est discretion in deciding whose conduct and what conduct should
be made the basis of arrest and, perhaps, trial.' 6 1
It is true and important that these efforts to limit the powers of
the police and regulate the relations between citizen and state in a
way that respects the primacy of the citizen were based on two sup-
positions that were, at least, shaky. The first was that police con-
duct on the street would largely be motivated by the desire to
gather evidence for trial, and thus could be regulated by excluding
evidence obtained in violation of the restrictions on police behav-
158. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). The later Burger and Rehnquist
Courts hedged the exclusionary rules crafted by the Warren Court in the 1960s. For
example, evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment or the Miranda rules
can be introduced at trial to impeach a defendant's testimony. E.g., United States v.
Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980) (permitting impeachment with evidence seized in viola-
tion of the Fourth Amendment); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (permitting
impeachment with a confession obtained in violation of Miranda). Such evidence is
also admissible in proceedings outside the context of the criminal trial. E.g., United
States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (grand jury proceedings); United States v.
Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976) (civil tax proceedings). The Court has reasoned that the
rule of exclusion is grounded in a policy of deterrence, which is satisfied by the exclu-
sion in the prosecution's case-in-chief, and should not be applied where principles of
deterrence will not be furthered. E.g., United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 279-80
(1978); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984).
159. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 6 (1989).
160. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 354-59 (1967).
161. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972).
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ior. Second, and equally important, the rules did not provide pro-
tection against, or regulate in any significant way, some very
powerful investigative techniques: informants; grand jury powers
to compel testimony prior to trial; offers by police to engage in
illegal transactions in order to develop evidence; various types of
physical surveillance; a variety of techniques for eliciting "consent"
to a form of detention or search; threats to prosecute an individual
who has committed a crime in order to get evidence; and, perhaps
most dramatically, the constitutional power to arrest some individ-
uals, and not others, for minor offenses in order to take advantage
of the power to search, within a limited area, in connection with an
arrest.162 Seeking greater freedom of action, a police officer or de-
partment could emphasize these unregulated powers. Even the
regulated powers could be violated without much fear of conse-
quences if the purpose was not to suppress evidence.
The new policing is intended, in many instances, to greatly in-
crease the effectiveness of these unregulated powers and to find
ways to avoid judicial enforcement by the exclusionary rule of even
such regulated powers as stop and frisk. Findings by the attorney
general of the State of New York suggest that there has not been
an adequate effort by the New York police to restrict frisks or stops
to the situations where the Constitution permits them.163 The re-
sult of many tens of thousands of such stops has undoubtedly been
a sizeable reduction in the carrying of guns and thereby of homi-
cides, but there is a price for abandoning this part of the system of
accountability for detentions and searches. A rapid increase in
misdemeanor arrests or the use of a variety of other formal or in-
formal sanctions in situations where the average citizen would not
be subjected to that police power recreates the very capacity to
target specific individuals, gangs and other groups-particularly
minority youth-that the Supreme Court had tried to forbid by
outlawing the use of vague statutes.
In a number of situations in a number of cities, a major compo-
nent of the new policing strategy is to rely more and more on that
set of police powers that are substantially unregulated by law and
to take advantage of the inability of courts to hold the police ac-
countable by recourse to the exclusion of evidence-all in order to
162. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 226 (1973).
163. CIVIL RIGHTS BUREAU, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN. OF THE STATE OF
N.Y., THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT'S "STOP & FRISK" PRACTICES: A
REPORT TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK FROM THE OFFICE OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL, 69-72, 160-74 (Dec. 1, 1999) [hereinafter OAG REPORT].
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focus unreviewable police discretion on those forms of conduct and
those individuals that the police somehow determine are most dan-
gerous. This conscious use of the weaknesses in the control system
built up since 1950 has had dramatic and beneficial results in han-
dling crime, but not without significant risks of changing the rela-
tionship of the citizen to the state, and of the police to individuals
on the street. It may well be that most people in most neighbor-
hoods regard the tradeoff as highly favorable to the new polic-
ing. It is nonetheless dangerous to democratic values.
2. Equal Protection: Civil Rights
There has been only extremely rare use of the Equal Protection
Clause to regulate police conduct, on the theory that important in-
trusions such as arrest and search are adequately regulated by the
requirements of probable cause and that minor intrusions, which
have not been regulated by the Constitution or statute, hardly de-
serve special attention. But the second part of this judgment has
proven to be inadequate in a number of ways. Stopping more
blacks and Hispanics than non-Hispanic whites either without the
justification of reasonable suspicion or with the justification of hav-
ing observed a violation of the law-albeit one that is generally
ignored in the case of others-may have relatively minor immedi-
ate effects on an individual, but immense importance in what it
says about the place of black or Hispanic Americans in society and
in terms of the felt reality of the promise of equal protection of the
laws that they have been given by the U.S. Constitution. Moreo-
ver, it may be the embarrassment and resentment of being singled
out as a suspect, far more than the intrusion on one's privacy, that
needs protection, as Chief Justice Earl Warren recognized in writ-
ing the opinion in Terry v. Ohio sustaining stop and frisk.165 Fi-
nally, what may be a minor intrusion, if it occurs on a single
occasion, may be a major problem if it occurs regularly enough to
fuel the fears and affect the conduct of members of a suspect class
(for example, minority youth in a high-crime area).
Beyond the costs of these largely unreviewable uses of powers
against those the police believe, often correctly, to be more likely
to be engaged in a particular type of crime, there is the problem of
spillover to clear violations of the rules with respect to arrest,
search, or interrogation. The brutality and excessive force dis-
164. Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, Laws and (Norms of) Order in the Inner
City, 32 L. & Soc'y REV. 805, 830 (1998).
165. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 15, 24-26 (1968).
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played in the Abner Louima and Amadou Diallo cases in New
York City bolster African Americans' sense of insecurity, as well as
their reluctance to enjoy the basic civil liberties accorded to all
citizens.' 66
To the extent that the new policing encourages the police to fo-
cus investigative attention on the earliest signs of criminal behavior
or even on disorder alone, it invites using even weak evidence as a
basis for finding reasonable suspicion and for the invocation of
powers that do not ordinarily require any justification or form of
accountability. Thus, a review by New York State Attorney Gen-
eral Eliot Spitzer of 175,000 forms detailing stop and frisk activity
in New York City showed that even police records reflect about
nine stops of blacks and Hispanics and eight stops of whites for
each resulting arrest. 167 In its focus on problem-solving, the new
policing also emphasizes the steps that can be taken against an in-
dividual without any individualized basis in fact. A common exam-
ple is stopping a driver and searching his or her car for drugs under
the pretext of concern that the car's taillight is not working or that
its speed is excessive and that the car is thus being operated in
violation of a local ordinance. Such forms of policing allow and
encourage the use of guesses and probabilities that are far less de-
pendent on evidence, compared to what has traditionally been re-
quired for a stop, an arrest, or a search to gather information.
Weaker requirements of justification for police action almost in-
variably invite more bias. The Spitzer study showed that "even
when crime is accounted for statistically, minorities still were being
'stopped' at a higher rate than whites;" blacks were 23% more
likely and Hispanics 39% more likely than white non-Hispanics to
be stopped by police.168 Generalizations about the greater likeli-
hood that a particular group will be involved in a particular crimi-
nal activity, such as dealing crack cocaine, are now more likely to
be made the basis for substantial disparities in treatment than they
were before strategic emphasis was put on the unregulated areas of
police conduct.169 Then, even if members of a hypothetical group
166. See Joseph P. Fried & Blaine Harden, The Louima Case: The Overview-Of-
ficer is Guilty in Torture of Louima, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 1999, at Al; see also Jane
Fritsch, The Diallo Verdict: The Overview-4 Officers in Diallo Shooting Are Acquit-
ted of All Charges, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2000, at Al.
167. OAG REPORT, supra note 163, at 111.
168. Id. at 119, 123.
169. E.g., Dan Weikel, War on Crack Targets Minorities Over Whites, L.A. TIMES,
May 21, 1995, at Al (reporting that evidence in southern California and throughout
the U.S. indicates that the vast majority of crack offenders prosecuted in federal court
2000]
452 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVIII
X were more likely than others to be selling crack cocaine, the like-
lihood of any particular member of X being engaged in that con-
duct is generally so small that it could not satisfy probable cause or
reasonable suspicion standards.
Questioning someone (for example, a Hispanic youth) on a cor-
ner in a way that suggests he is not free to leave, which the Su-
preme Court has allowed, 7 ° or searching a car, or making a street
stop of a pedestrian are all likely to be based, to some extent, on
the racial or ethnic characteristics that the police believe more fre-
quently accompany crimes of concern. 171 A focus on types of dan-
gerous or criminal behavior, rather than on the behavior of specific
individuals, invites these generalizations. It is also at the heart of
much of the new policing. It is in this context that we should un-
derstand the debate about racial profiling.
3. Respect and Civility
Sara Stoutland argues, on the basis of an ethnographic study of
the reactions of youth and their older family members in Boston,
that neighborhoods subjected to the new policing in Boston are
pleased with the safety it has provided but concerned about the
absence of respect shown to the citizens it confronts. 72 One also
can detect this disparity in the review of attitudes towards policing
in New York and Chicago.
This issue is related to, but different from, concerns about equal
protection and legally defined civil liberties. An absence of respect
may be the source of much of the offense given by a failure to treat
certain stigmatized groups of citizens equally with other groups;
but the issue of respect is broader and is applicable to police inter-
actions with any group of citizens. The difference in treatment be-
tween groups may be attributable to differences in political clout,
as the influence of one group may elicit respectful handling by the
police while the absence of such influence may invite less respect-
ful relations for the other. Ethnic or racial bias may not be the
are non-white people), cited by Symposium, Is Our Drug Policy Effective? Are There
Alternatives?, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 3, 79-83 (2000) (discussing the disproportionate
impact on African Americans and Hispanics of the disparity in length of prison terms
imposed for crack cocaine offenses versus those imposed for powder cocaine offenses
for like amounts of those drugs).
170. E.g., Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491
(1983); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
171. United States v. Weaver, 966 F.2d 391, 394 (8th Cir. 1992).
172. Sara Stoutland, Trust, Legitimacy, and Efforts to Reduce Youth Violent
Crime: Community Perspectives from Boston 26 (March 1, 2000) (unpublished manu-
script, on file with author).
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issue. An absence of respect also often reflects a sense that the
individual is without rights against the state. But here, too, there is
a difference. An officer making a stop and then frisking a citizen
on a crowded street may be acting well within the parameters of
reasonable suspicion that the law imposes, yet the way the stop is
made may convey humiliating contempt for the suspect.
It is becoming very clear that the cause of much violence by
youth against other youth is a sense of being treated without re-
spect. The resulting attack is a distorted form of insistence on be-
ing treated with dignity and as an important person. Distinguished
police commissioners, such as Commissioner Evans in Boston, con-
tend that even forcible encounters like a stop or arrest can, in most
cases, be handled in a way that reflects respect for the suspect.17 3
Police officers in the housing projects of Chicago report that they
can make arrests without danger to themselves or others if they
treat the suspect with respect. 174 All these beliefs are practical rea-
sons, from the point of view of law enforcement, for insisting on at
least the appearance of a respectful attitude toward those who are
confronted with real or apparent powers of the police.
The issue is at least equally important from the point of view of
many law-abiding residents in a neighborhood for whom a continu-
ing question is whether the police are there to support them or to
protect people in other areas from them or their children. Citizens
who feel themselves and their children the object of policing in-
tended to protect others and who feel that the steps taken reflect a
lack of respect for them as citizens and individuals are made to feel
like second-class citizens, used rather than valued. They are also
taught to fear the police rather than to value their services, an atti-
tude that creates sympathy for youth in revolt and frustration for
their elders who need protection but insist on respect.
Some significant forms of the new policing involve dealing with
individuals through implicit coercion. In New York, signaling that
it is the police who control the streets by zero tolerance policing,
claiming to decide what is acceptable conduct and what is disor-
derly behavior, and gathering information by "leaning on" those
who are vulnerable to revocation of parole or probation-all these
173. First Safety, Then Civility: Boston and New York, ECONOMIST, May 1, 1999, at
25 (citing Commissioner Evans' statement that many of the problems associated with
the stop and search of suspects disappear when "there is mutual respect" and "the
police explain why the search is being done").
174. E.g., Jerry Lawrence, Officers' Class Focused on Race Relations, CHI. TRIB.,
June 19, 2000, at 1 (describing a seminar offered by a former police officer on the
need to treat citizens, especially racial and ethnic minorities, with respect).
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may be extremely useful steps in creating security but extremely
costly in denying respect. In Boston, the gathering of information
by relatively coercive questioning on the streets, accompanied by
conveying some notion of the power of computerized retrieval of
such information, can have the same beneficial and harmful effects.
All these activities are designed to take place beneath the radar
of judicial review, another consequence that Chief Justice Warren
anticipated when reviewing powers to stop and frisk. The effects
on the citizens in the neighborhood and on their attitudes towards
the police are captured in the statistical assessments of policing in
Chicago and New York. 75
4. The Task of the Future: Maintaining the Security Advantages
of the New Policing while Reducing its Risks to Civil Liberties
There is every reason to believe that the great majority of people
in almost every city and the clear majority of those in the neighbor-
hoods most threatened by both insecurity and the risks to civil lib-
erties would, if forced to choose, prefer the new forms of policing.
The advantages of personal security are that great. Indeed, as
noted above, a majority of the residents of some Chicago housing
projects were prepared to give up their right to refuse to have their
apartments searched without probable cause in the interests of
greater personal security. 176
But the choice should not be so stark. Uses of discretion that are
beneath the level of visibility to courts could be the subject of de-
partmental regulation. The reliance on the exclusionary rule as a
primary sanction need not mean that it is the exclusive sanction.
What we need, in short, is a regulatory system with other sanctions
and new rules. We must find ways to have both civil liberties and
security.
Consider some examples of new forms of regulation. The prob-
lem of changed relationships between the citizen and the state, be-
tween the resident and the police officer, could be addressed, in
part, by requiring the police to make clear when they are asserting
authority and when they are simply making a request to stop or
submit to a search. The Supreme Court has ruled that this is not
required by the Constitution.177 But the practice of taking advan-
tage of a citizen's ignorance of constitutional rights or his un-
175. Supra Part II.A.3.
176. See Meares & Kahan, supra note 12.
177. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S.
218 (1973).
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founded fears remains subject to political review and it is unwise in
light of an increasing emphasis on control of the streets and the
gathering of information by informal means. Efforts to keep track
of the percentage of black, Hispanic, and white, non-Hispanic driv-
ers of cars that are stopped and to make those figures available
publicly are regulatory steps that can have major consequences on
a sense of discrimination.178 Keeping track of the number of com-
plaints against any officer for disrespectful behavior can be an
important step in encouraging respect, particularly if it is accompa-
nied by appropriate remedial training.
Most rules require some sanctions if they are to be taken seri-
ously. For behavior that is not generally designed to elicit evidence
for criminal trials-the situation with regard to much of the new
policing-the exclusionary rule is plainly an inadequate sanction.
Nor is there much promise in the form of civil lawsuits, which are
likely to be much too costly for remedying the risks to civil liberties
in the multitude of low visibility occurrences that are at issue. Ad-
ministrative discipline under rules that are more manageable is one
likely solution.
Regulatory schemes require credibility and credibility often re-
quires some form of external oversight, not of individual adminis-
trative determinations but of the adequacy of the functioning of the
administrative system, as New York's "Mollen Commission" sug-
gested some years ago.179 In the past decade, independent partner-
ships like that between the Boston Police Department and the Ten
Point Coalition have benefited both the organizations and the city
as a whole. By blending criticism with approval, the Coalition has
helped cultivate the police programs that are responsible for Bos-
ton's remarkable success. Significantly, the fruits of this effort-
the drop in youth homicide, drug use, and overall crime-are no-
where more apparent than on the streets of Dorchester and
Roxbury, where furor over police abuse first erupted.
Relationships like this one help fill the void left by the erosion of
judicial oversight. They are, however, comparatively rare. An un-
fortunate series of events, coupled with an unprecedented willing-
178. Police Tactics in Question: 'Stop and Frisk' in New York, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4,
1999, at A16.
179. CITY OF N.Y. COMM'N TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE CORRUP-
TION & THE ANTI-CORRUPTION PROCEDURES OF THE POLICE DEP'T, REPORT OF
NEW YORK COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE CORRUPTION
AND THE ANTI-CORRUPTION PROCEDURES OF THE POLICE DEPARTMENT (1994). The
Commission is popularly known as the "Mollen Commission," after its chair, the Hon.
Milton Mollen.
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ness by Boston's police chiefs and black ministers to work together,
brought about this unlikely partnership. Its enduring nature testi-
fies to their commitment and mutual dependence. As in other cit-
ies, there are still tensions between officers and the minority
residents whom the Coalition represents. This friction assures each
organization's independence. What remains to be seen is whether
cities like New York, in the wake of outrage over assaults like
those on Abner Louima and Amadou Diallo, will be willing to
reach out as Boston did following the Carol Stuart murder and the
stop and frisk scandal in the early 1990s.
These suggestions are meant to be illustrative, and they are far
from comprehensive. The central idea is that new rules are re-
quired to regulate the new policing and that these cannot take the
form of judicial review of the admissibility of evidence. They prob-
ably cannot depend primarily on any form of judicial sanctions for
violations of the rules, both because the rules will be developed
administratively and because they will regulate forms of behavior
that have long been considered too subtle to justify judicial review.
What we need is the acceptance of new forms of responsibility for
civil liberties by police agencies involved in the forms of new polic-
ing. Credible oversight must involve those outside of the police
but it should be of processes and structures, not of individual cases.
